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REGULATING DISCOURTESY ON THE
BENCH: A STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
BRUCE A. GREEN* AND REBECCA ROIPHE**
With few exceptions, our discussions of law posit an "ideal,"
super-human, passionless, judge. In an occasional aside we ad-
mit that ajudge may be affected by "weakness" when he allows
his feelings to enter into his reasoning. But the manner of re-
ferring to these "weaknesses" indicates a belief that they are
exceptional and pathological. Now even if the humanness of
judges were pathological, it would deserve explicit attention as
part of "a liberal understanding or science of the law." But
calm observation discloses that such "frailties" are normal, not
diseased; recurrent, not exceptional. And a study of law which
shoves the consideration of the normal and usual into a foot-
note and labels it 'unusual and morbid' cannot lead to any-
thing like an adequate understanding of the subject.
-JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MID (1951)
A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
- MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 2.8(b)
* Louis Stein Professor of Law and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and
Ethics, Fordham University School of Law; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1981; B.A.,
Princeton University, 1978. The idea for this article and many of the ideas in it
originated in the course of our retention as consultants on behalf of a judge who
faced discipline for alleged impoliteness in the course ofjudicial work. The matter
on which we worked was resolved without a hearing, finding of wrongdoing, or
sanction and is not addressed in this article, and the ideas we express here had no
role in the judge's defense or any other practical utility. Nonetheless, we
acknowledge that our views on the tension between judicial accountability and
independence are influenced by having observed the operation of the judicial
disciplinary rules and process from the perspective of a judge for whom we have
professional admiration and personal affection.
We would like to thank Molly Buetz, Elizabeth Chambliss, Steve Ellmann,
Doni Gewirtzman, James Grimmelmann, Ed Purcell, Tanina Rostain, and the
participants of the New York Law School Junior Faculty Workshop for their
insights.
** Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; Ph.D., University of
Chicago, 2002; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2000; BA, Columbia University, 1993.
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We like to believe that judges decide cases based on the law,
not on emotions. Thus the image of Justice as a goddess, blind-
folded to emphasize the judge's inability to see litigants in light that
might evoke irrational sympathy.' Beginning in the late nineteenth
century, legal realists such as Jerome Frank exposed the myth of the
law devoid of the human element,2 but the illusion has persisted.
3
Ever since the Civil War, an important elite within the bar has em-
phasized judicial courtesy as a way of preserving this ideal of judg-
ing as objective, impersonal, and free from the taint of an
individual judge's emotions and intuitions.
4
This understanding of the courts populated by detached and
passive judges has come to seem essential to the independence of
the judicial branch of government. 5 This has particularly been so
in periods of our history when any of three conditions are present:
first, when the democratic process poses a threat of social chaos;
second, when courts are resolving the divisive issues of the day in a
manner that seems overfly partisan; and finally, when scandals in-
volving judicial conduct become public.6 The history of attitudes
and rules concerning judicial demeanor, however, demonstrates
that this understanding of independence is not necessary to the le-
gitimacy of the judiciary. 7 This Article explains the persistence of
the myth of the emotionally detached judge and argues thatjudicial
1. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAgv. L. Rv. 374, 382-83, 446-47
(1982).
2. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (2008). See grnera1y MORTONJ.
HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LE-
GAL ORTHODOXY 188 (1992); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY. SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-94 (1973).
3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of
Constitutional Dedsionmaking, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1069 (2006); Barry Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
971, 1057-59 (2000).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/shlO9-
158/55-56.pdf [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings] (statement of Judge John G.
Roberts, Jr.) ("Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply
them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody
plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see
an umpire.").
6. See infra Part II.C-E.
7. SeeJohn A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judici-
ary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 963-64 (2002) (argu-
ing that both independence and accountability ought to be seen as means to foster
a well-functioning judiciary rather than an end in themselves).
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regulation, insofar as it embodies this myth, runs the risk of under-
mining the quality of judging, obscuring the transparency of judi-
cial decisions, and deterring the development of diverse judicial
styles.8 The Article concludes that legislatures, the bench, and the
bar ought to revive an older strand of independence, which we will
refer to as "personal independence." Personal independence en-
sures that judges can draw on their personalities, emotions, and in-
tuitions to craft solutions to the cases that come before them.9
Judicial independence has meant different things at different
times. From the beginning of the twentieth century to the present,
the emphasis on judicial courtesy marked a growing concern with
courtroom atmospherics and the public image of the judiciary.
The bar and the judiciary grew increasingly afraid that if this image
were not preserved, the public through the legislature would regu-
late the judicial branch in such a way as to disturb its independence
from the political branches. This concern grew to predominate,
and by the 1970s, the bar and the judiciary responded by enforcing
judicial branch regulation of individual judges. In doing so, they
undermined personal independence (championed by a few promi-
nent lawyers and judges including United States Supreme Court
Justices William 0. Douglas and Hugo Black) by interfering with
individual judges' freedom to draw on their own personalities, ex-
periences, and intuitions to decide cases-an aspect of indepen-
dence that had been taken for granted in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.
Part I of the Article grounds the discussion by explaining how
ideas of judicial independence evolved until the late nineteenth
century. In the early years following independence, judicial inde-
pendence was thought to be secured by salary protection and ten-
ure during good behavior; these constitutional guarantees would
ensure branch independence by preventing the judiciary from be-
coming a tool of the executive, while a degree of financial security
would also enable judges to exercise virtue by subordinating their
own interests to that of the law or the good of all.10 In the antebel-
8. See infra Part III.
9. There is an evolving literature on the importance of emotion to the law
and the judicial process. See Richard Posner, Emotion vs. Emotionalism in Law, in
THE PASSIONS OF THE LAW 309, 321-25 (Susan A. Bandes ed. 1999) (arguing that
judges should be in tune with the emotions that lead to the moral code of society
and should be empathic not simply with the parties before them but with all those
affected by a rule or decision). See generally Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotions:
An Emerging Taxonomy, 30 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006) (providing an overview
of this scholarship).
10. See infra Part I.B.
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lur period, a judge's personal and pragmatic sense of the just re-
sult was seen as not only consistent with but also critical to the
judicial process. The legitimacy and vitality of the judiciary as an
institution owed itself, in part, to the judge's ability to bring his
entire experience, understanding, and intuition to bear on the
cases before him. But the Civil War undermined the legitimacy of
the judicial branch by sweeping courts into the ideological and po-
litical divide. To restore a sense of legitimacy to the judiciary, ob-
servers began to envision judges as machines calibrated to
determine the proper meaning of the law. As the nineteenth cen-
tury drew to a close, the idiosyncrasies of individual judges-that
which made them human-grew to seem anathema to an impor-
tant elite within the bar.
Part II demonstrates how and why certain elites within the bar
enshrined this particular view of judges as detached administrators
of the law into written standards of courtroom conduct, some of
which we refer to as "courtesy rules."'1 The drafters of the 1924
Canons of Judicial Ethics used judicial courtesy rules as a means of
promoting the public perception that, unlike the common man,
judges are objective, nonpartisan, and predictable. 12 They did so in
order to counter a growing public dissatisfaction with courts, which
some observers believed had devolved into mere partisans in the
political battles of the day.ls The drafters of the Canons hoped that
by reinforcing the image of the judge as impersonal and justice as
mechanical, they could deflect that anger away from the judiciary to
a better shielded target: the law or the Constitution.
14
As a new generation of jurists grew to accept that judges do, in
fact, draw on their own experience and ideology to decide cases,
the definition of independence subtly shifted. Part III argues that
the drafters of the 1972 Code ofJudicial Conduct used the courtesy
rules as part of a concerted effort to transform the judiciary into a
bureaucratic institution. By doing so, they hoped to promote uni-
formity and regularity, which they believed would lend legitimacy to
the justice system. Thus, they drafted the ethical standards to be
binding, and reinforced the judicial hierarchy by enabling judges,
lawyers, and bureaucrats to police the ranks of the judiciary. In this
way, they hoped to preserve the independence of the judiciary from
the other two branches of government without sacrificing the ap-
11. We use the term "courtesy rules" to denote any written rules, whether
enforceable or not, which purport to govern judicial demeanor.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
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pearance of a consistent and predictable outcome. In doing so,
however, the bar overlooked how this new bureaucratic system-
like the Canons that came before-effaced an older assumption im-
plicit in the concept of independence: that judges can and should
draw on their own personal experiences and intuitions to decide
cases.
Part IV demonstrates how the enforcement of contemporary
rules ofjudicial courtesy reinforces this particular bureaucratic defi-
nition of independence. This Part argues that those rules, in opera-
tion, deter judges from developing individual courtroom styles
suited to the sorts of cases before them and in accord with their
own judicial philosophies.
The Article concludes that the judicial courtesy rules reflect a
broader unwillingness to part with a conception of judging based
on an antiquated understanding of judicial independence. This
notion ofjudging as the suppression of judicial personality plays on
a particular longing for certainty and predictability in the law that
grows especially intense as the prevailing social norms seem inse-
cure. Clinging to these antiquated symbols, however, provides an
illusory justification for judicial activism, distracts judges from pur-
suing other sources of legitimacy in light of the practical demands
of their dockets, and impedes the proliferation of diverse and dis-
tinct judicial styles. Thus, ironically, the antidote designed to re-
lieve courts of public displeasure invites more problems than it
solves. To avoid such consequences, judicial courtesy rules should
be cautiously enforced.
Scholars are engaged in an extended dialog about the mean-
ing ofjudicial independence. 15 This debate, in turn, has enormous
implications for the role the judiciary should play in American de-
mocracy.16 Up until this point, the discussion has ignored the ac-
tive role the bench and bar have played in perpetuating a vision of
judging which requires freedom from the emotional response char-
15. See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AP-
PROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002); Gordon Bermant &
Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Ac-
countability, 46 MERCER L. REv. 835, 836-38 (1995); Archibald Cox, The Indepen-
dence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYrON L. REv. 565 (1996); Richard
A. Epstein, The Independence ofJudges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory,
1990 BYU L. REV. 827 (1990); Pamela S. Karlan,Judicial Independences, 95 GEo. LJ.
1041 (2007); Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
311 (1999).
16. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1986); Barry Friedman, "Things Forgotten" in the
Debate Over Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 737 (1998).
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acteristic of the political process. It has also overlooked the way in
which the Code of Judicial Conduct has contributed to a bureau-
cratic understanding of the judiciary as a distinct branch of govern-
ment. By exploring the history of judicial courtesy and explaining
the persistence of this understanding of the judicial role, this Arti-
cle helps uncover alternative definitions of independence, which
serve to promote, rather than undermine, judicial quality.
I.
THE EARLY HISTORY OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, THE ROLE OF JUDGES,
AND THE COURTESY RULES
In colonial times, when judicial independence primarily meant
independence from the Crown, judicial personality was given rela-
tively free play. After the Revolution and roughly until the Civil
War, a pragmatic approach to judging coexisted with the faith in
natural law, and courts remained unconcerned about the effects of
individual judges' emotions and personalities on performance of
the judicial function. This changed, however, with the Civil War,
which raised challenges to the courts' legitimacy centered on the
perceived political nature of judicial lawmaking. In response, the
idea of judicial independence expanded to focus on the courts' in-
dependence from the people and from their incursions through
legislation. Seeking to recapture public respect, courts and com-
mentators began to promote a formalistic theory of judging pre-
mised on the idea that judges reach inevitable results through the
application of pure reason. Eliminating expressions of individual
judges' sentiment and emotion from the performance of their work
was important to reinforce this conception. Thus, the idea of judi-
cial courtesy as an aspect of impersonal decision making was a
break from the past that found its roots in a new understanding of
judicial independence and a new rationale for preserving it.
A. The Beginnings: Colonial and Frontier Judging
Even in the colonial period, observers recognized the impor-
tance of an independent judiciary. 17 As one pamphlet put it: "The
men therefore who are to settle the contests between prerogative
and liberty, who are to ascertain the bounds of sovereign power and
to determine the rights of the subject, ought certainly to be per-
17. For the origin of the idea of judicial independence, see Irving R. Kauf-
man, The Essence ofJudicial Independence, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 671, 672-87 (1980).
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fectly free from the influence of either."18 While judges were
largely free from the influence of the Crown, they were in some
ways beholden to town representatives, who controlled their sala-
ries.19 Colonists did not, however, seem overly concerned about
this potential pressure on judicial independence.20 Their concern
was with the perils of a judiciary that was excessively beholden to
the executive.
21
It is evident, even from the sparse historical record, that the
experimental nature of colonial courts required a spontaneous and
flexible style of judging. Most colonies developed an informal law
that was easy to understand. The New England colonies adapted
English law and procedure to the new setting, consciously moving
away from the strict formal and elaborate rules.22 In some colonial
courts, litigants would choose their own judges to hear their cases-
an arbitration of sorts.23 In New England, courts functioned much
like church congregations or town meetings, navigating everyday
disputes between neighbors in communities which, for the most
part, shared common sets of values.2 4 On the frontier, justice was
18. A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania, &c, in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, at 257 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965).
19. Id. at 262, 268.
20. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of
Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 161
(2003).
21. Id. at 167; A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania, &c, supra note 18, at
262.
22. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 45 (2d ed. 1985).
23. Id.; WILLIAM E. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH
COUNTY, MASSACHUSETrS, 1725-1825 (1981). Each precinct in Pennsylvania, for
instance, appointed three persons known as "Common Peacemakers," who would
referee all disputes without appeal to governor or council. LARRY A. BA.KKEN, JUS-
TICE IN THE WILDERNESS: A STUDY OF FRONTIER COURTS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1670-1870, at 88 (1986).
24. MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977); NELSON, supra note 23, at 134. Typical cases involved debts, slander, moral
offenses, trespass, and breaches of Sabbath laws. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 22,
at 31-105 (discussing the structure and the role of courts in the colonies). Many
magistrates had never practiced law, and some governors served, part-time, as
chancellors. Id. at 125. Many of these lay judges had been politicians or served in
the military. They populated all levels of the judiciary, including appellate courts.
WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 33 (1994). In keeping with a
long tradition in England, the key to becoming a magistrate was not a background
in the law, but rather status in the community. Mostjudges were prominent local
citizens who had either been born into an important family or who had achieved
status through public service. Id.
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especially informal. 25 Rudiments of the English system were im-
ported, tested, and altered if they did not suit the surroundings.
2 6
Magistrates, who lacked a "professional touch,"27 responded to ne-
cessity in a personal way in order to resolve the disputes before
them.
2
With little responsibility for interpreting or creating law, judges
frequently confronted situations that required improvisation. They
mediated more than they presided. They improvised justice rather
than applying a set body of law. They were active, not in the con-
temporary sense of overruling legislative judgment or interpreting
precedent broadly, but rather in the common meaning of that
term, playing an active role in negotiating between parties, devising
punishments, and monitoring compliance with court orders. One
might easily conclude that such tasks required assertion rather than
suppression of judicial personality.
B. Reason and Emotion: Judging from the Revolution to the Civil War
The years leading up to the Revolution saw a growing concern
about the independence of the judicial branch from the executive.
With the early republican fervor, few thought to suggest that the
judiciary ought to be independent from the people. In the wake of
the Revolution, however, after experiencing what some considered
the extreme redistributive impulses of state legislatures, many crit-
ics grew wary of the whims of the popular will and, therefore, began
to affirm the importance of a judiciary independent from both the
executive and legislative branches.2 This notion of judicial inde-
pendence embraced individual as well as branch independence.
25. See BAKKEN, supra note 23.
26. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 45.
27. COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS (1639-1702): THE
PYNCHON COURT RECORD 31 (John H. Smith ed., William Nelson Cromwell Foun-
dation 1961). Pynchon was responsible for establishing the first court and ad-
ministeringjustice in western Massachusetts between 1640 and 1651. Unlike most
of his contemporaries, Pynchon kept meticulous records, which have survived and
are compiled in this volume.
28. For example, William Pynchon, a justice in western Massachusetts be-
tween 1640 and 1651, described one incident, oddly foreshadowing modem case
management, in which he urged a litigant who contested the validity of a jury
verdict to ask his adversary to consent to a new jury trial by "indifferent men any-
where in the River." When the malcontent litigant rejected Pynchon's admoni-
tions and instead simply refused to pay the judgment against him, Pynchon issued
a warrant for his arrest. Id. at 207-08. Matters concerning Indians similarly
pushed judges to favor expediency over rules and forms. See id. at 223.
29. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); LARv D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM ANDJUDICIAL REVIEw 73 (2004);
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Individual judicial independence, in civic republican terms, de-
noted the financial freedom necessary to be virtuous and suppress
self-interest for the sake of the common good.3 0 Because the threat
to judicial independence came primarily in the form of legislative
manipulation of judicial tenure and salary, the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention adopted judicial tenure and salary pro-
tections.3 1 Independence was not an end in itself; it was a means to
ensure that judges would correctly ascertain the meaning of the law
and the just result without being swayed by a need to secure money
or favors.3
2
After the election of 1800, Jefferson and his allies fought
against the Federalist judiciary.33 They challenged the idea of a ju-
diciary independent from the people, arguing that the government
should be entrusted to the people rather than removed from their
control. In response, the Federalists, wary of the unchecked pas-
sions of the people, argued more vehemently that an independent
judiciary was necessary to curb popular excess.5 4 As the Federalists
defended their ground, they expanded the concept of indepen-
dence to include freedom from the sway of transient legislative ma-
jorities.3 5 The perceived source of this new form of independence
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 436
(1969).
30. WOOD, supra note 29, at 452; Geyh, supra note 20, at 159. As Alexander
Hamilton wrote, "[A] power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.
1961). Generally, the founders assumed that if a judge possessed the requisite
financial and professional security, he would necessarily act in such a way to pre-
serve the independence of the judicial branch. See Geyh, supra note 20, at 159; A
Letter to the People of Pennsylvania, &c, supra note 18, at 268-69. In other words,
personal independence secured through salary and tenure protections would al-
low judges to suppress their own self-interest for the good of the community.
31. CHARLES GARDNER GEH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUG-
GLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 24-43 (2006). Article III pro-
vided, "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Ser-
vices a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
32. WOOD, supra note 29, at 538.
33. Right before his term ended, John Adams passed the so-called Midnight
Judges Act, which created more federal judgeships, which Adams then quickly
staffed with partisan allies. The Jeffersonians spent much of the first years of the
nineteenth century trying to disestablish the courts and remove the objectionable
judges. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 127-28.
34. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countemajoritarian Dficulty, Pat One.
The Road toJudicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 360-62 (1998).
35. See id. at 361.
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shifted from financial security to the fixed nature of the law. Based
on their ability to discern and elaborate set principles of law, Feder-
alists argued, judges could maintain a middle ground between the
people and those who governed them.36 Swayed neither by the
trappings of power nor the emotions of the crowd, the ideal judges
possessed a kind of dignity that put them above the impetuous re-
sponses of the average citizen.
37
While politicians fought over the role of the judiciary, courts
and the nature of judging itself changed. By the middle of the
eighteenth century, courts were beginning to move from the simple
to the complex. English forms, models, and terms gradually infil-
trated the colonies in New England. 3a Economic expansion de-
manded more uniformity and stability in the law, and judges
responded by deciding issues of law, leaving only factual disputes to
the jury.39 Economic growth brought increasingly complex cases
before the courts, and the outcomes could affect the course of so-
cial change.4° Judges became policymakers in addition to arbiters
between disputing parties. They played a greater role in fashioning
the law that mattered, defining rights in real property, the law of
negligence, business contracts, and commercial instruments. 41 The
common law, which previously had been viewed as a fixed body of
principles used to resolve disputes between individuals, came to be
seen as an evolving agent of change. 42 Judges' roles changed ac-
cordingly, and the judiciary gradually grew more professional.
Trained in law, judges began to criticize the casual form of justice
of the earlier colonial courts. 43
36. See id. at 359.
37. WOOD, supra note 29, at 452.
38. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 48.
39. NELSON, supra note 23, at 165-74.
40. See generally BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMU-
NITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987) (arguing that in the first half of the nineteenth
century, the legal profession developed an autonomous system of law that was dis-
tinct from the individual disputes before courts).
41. HoRWrrz, supra note 24, at 2; JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAw: THE LAWMAKERS 185 (2001); WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND ExPE-
RIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 4-5 (1994).
42. HoRwrrz, supra note 24, at 4; HURST, supra note 41, at 185 (discussing the
courts "fashioning a body of common law for the main affairs of everyday life");
WILLIAM J. NovAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 40 (1996).
43. See EMORY WASHBURN, SKETCHES OF THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF MASSACHU-
sEi-rs: FROM 1630 TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1775, at 189-90, 201-02 (1840).
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On one level, legal thinkers embraced the new role of judges
as agents of social change. 44 But at the same time, they retained
faith in natural law as the source of common law.45 In either case,
the process of administering the law and the ideology of how it
worked allowed room for the creative and individual input of the
judge. In the early nineteenth century, trial court judges still
played an active part in resolving disputes and enforcing societal
values. They understood their own role as ensuring the correct or
just result, and they engaged in a casual and informal dialogue with
the jury to encourage that outcome. 4 6 As most jurists saw it, impar-
tiality and independence entitled judges not simply to decide issues
of law but also to direct and often determine the outcome of any
case, preserving justice from the corrupting influence of partisan
lawyers and a malleable jury.
4 7
Like most nineteenth-century intellectuals, jurists drew a sharp
distinction between reason and emotion.48 While they agreed that
the process ofjudging should never be "mechanical," they believed
reason rather than emotion ought to drive the judge.49 But no one
thought that judges were without affect altogether, nor, more im-
portantly, that emotion was absent from the process of judging.
While jurists argued that decisions should be delivered with resort
to pure intellect, they also insisted thatjudges be passionate in their
devotion tojustice. Horace Binney, a well known lawyer, statesman,
and orator, described William Tilghman, Chief Justice of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, as the perfect balance of these qualities:
44. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 1-30. Horwitz argues that by the end of the
eighteenth century, legal thinkers had embraced an instrumental notion of the
law, abandoning the assumption that judges find the law in favor of the conclusion
that judges make the law. Id. He concludes that judges exercised this power to
benefit the emerging commercial interests as well as the interests of the legal pro-
fession generally. Id. at 253-54, 256-57.
45. See Stephen M. Feldman, From PreModern to Modern Jurisprudence: The Onset
of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1394-1411 (1997) (arguing that in the early
nineteenth century, the instrumental approach to judging was consistent with faith
in natural law).
46. Renee Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Triak The
Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 195, 206-07 (2000).
47. Id. at 212.
48. DOUGLAS T. MILLER, THE NATURE OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1973).
49. As United States Supreme Court Justice William Johnson said, "[i] t is the
unenvied province of this Court to be directed by the head, and not the heart. In
deciding upon principles that must define the rights and duties of the citizen and
direct the future decisions ofjustice, no latitude is left for the exercise of feeling."
The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 164 (1814). For the sharp distinction between
intellect and emotions in nineteenth-century thought, see MILER, supra note 48.
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"The law was his master; he yielded implicit obedience to its be-
hests. Justice was the object of his affections; he defended her with
the devotion of a lover."50 While there was a sharp divide between
reason and emotion, the ideal judge properly balanced both rather
than embodying only the former.
In this era, when judicial personality, emotion, and creative
personal engagement were still considered important aspects of
judging, courtesy was an aspiration but never an invariable expecta-
tion even for the best judges. Praising Tilghman for his emotional
commitment to justice, Binney wrote: " [N] othing could rouse his
kind and courteous temper into resentment, more than a deliber-
ate effort to entangle justice in the meshes of chicane."5 1 While
acknowledging that "[i] t argues little against the Judge or the advo-
cate, that... there should be momentary lapses of the temper,"52
he noted that Tilghman always remained courteous.5 3
C. Mechanical Judging: From Reconstruction to the Progressive Era
After the Revolution, the demand grew for the codification of
all laws.5 4 Reflecting the faith in popular sovereignty, reformers
hoped to transform the judge into "mere machine" by ensuring
that 'Judges follow the letter of the law."55 This, according to the
proponents of codification, was the only way to prevent the people
from becoming "slaves to the magistrates." 56 The codification
movement faltered,57 but the underlying distrust of the judiciary
remained and made its way into understandings of judicial inde-
pendence and accountability.58 Particularly, the image of the ideal
judge as machine permeated conceptions of independence even as
the codification movement subsided.5 9
50. HORACE BINNY, EULOGIES UPON WILLuA TILGHMAN AND JOHN MARSHALL
23 (1861).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 34.
53. Id. at 35.
54. See David Dudley Field, Reform in the Legal Profession and the Laws, Ad-
dress to the Graduating Class of the Albany Law School (March 23, 1855), in 1
SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 494,
503-14 (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884).
55. WOOD, supra note 29, at 300-01 (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 403-07; see also CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERI-
CAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 103-06, 201
(1981).
58. Geyh, supra note 20, at 154-79.
59. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 403-07.
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At the same time, Andrew Jackson's call for direct democracy
brought new energy to the assault on the judicial branch.60 As the
Civil War approached, more and more states elected theirjudiciar-
ies.61 The earlier concern about judicial independence from the
transient mood of the populace subsided as the prevailing demo-
cratic theory promoted a more popular form of democracy.62 Re-
formers urged that an elected judiciary would be independent from
the political branches precisely because of its new accountability.6 3
The rise of party politics, in part, discredited the appointment sys-
tem.64 If judges were directly elected, the argument ran, the popu-
lation would ensure a judiciary whose opinions reflected justice
rather than the whims of "broken down politicians."6 5 The same
impulse led to evidentiary reforms that prohibited judges from
commenting on evidence to influence jury deliberations. 66 The re-
form movement, however, never caused a crisis of legitimacy for the
courts because, to a great extent, people still believed that there was
a set of determinate answers to all legal questions. 67 Courts might
have been overstepping their proper bounds by addressing political
questions, but there was no real basis to question the underlying
legitimacy of those bounds.
68
As the Civil War approached, however, the perceived distinc-
tion between law and politics began to break down. The country
split increasingly over the issue of slavery, and many turned to the
courts to resolve the question. 69 For the most part, judges, who
were motivated by a largely instrumental view of the law, rejected
the rhetoric of the anti-slavery movement by appealing to the prac-
60. While some of the critique focused on the lack of accountability, most
reformers of the time argued against judicial supremacy rather than focusing on
the countermajoritarian difficulty. Friedman, supra note 34, at 392-93.
61. Geyh, supra note 20, at 170.
62. See GEm, supra note 31, at 55-56; Caleb Nelson, A Re-EvaLuation of Schol-
ary Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum Ameica, 37 Am. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 190, 190 (1993).
63. Nelson, supra note 62, at 195-96.
64. See id. at 196.
65. Id.
66. See Lerner, supra note 46, at 220-21.
67. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 10; Geyh, supra note 20, at 179-88.
68. See Friedman, supra note 34, at 405-06.
69. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC 195-200 (Ward
M. McAfee ed., 2001) (describing the treatment of federal cases involving the slave
trade from 1842 through 1862, and noting that such treatment varied highly by
region). See generally THoMAs D. MoRIUs, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW,
1619-1860 (1996) (discussing court decisions in the South leading up to the Civil
War as one of the main sources of slavery law).
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tical need to maintain the union.70 In the aftermath of the Civil
War, Northerners criticized courts for abandoning principle in
favor of such instrumental concerns. 71 Pointing in particular to
Dred Scott, reformers argued that antebellum courts had devolved
into tools for a particular political agenda.7 2 Courts and scholars
responded to this crisis by identifying a new source of legitimacy for
the courts based on orthodox, or classical, legal theory, which pos-
ited a system of laws separate from both politics and morality.73
Rather than follow the whims of a particular political faction or the
mandates of expedience, jurists drew on the late-nineteenth-cen-
tury infatuation with science to elaborate a new formalist jurispru-
dence.7 4  According to this jurisprudence, classification,
systematization, and a particular form of deductive reasoning set
the law apart from morality and politics. The common law judge
was thus engaged in the process of locating preexisting principles.
7 5
Even if such principles had never been formulated, they were be-
lieved to exist independent of any particular case.
7 6
As formalism replaced the instrumental reading of the law and
any residue of the natural law tradition, the image of the judge un-
derwent its own revision. 77 Law as science required objective out-
70. William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Anti-Slavery Movement Upon Styles of
Judicial Reasoning in the Nineteenth Century, 87 HARv. L. REV. 513, 538-39 (1974).
71. Id. at 544-50.
72. Id.; Friedman, supra note 34, at 414.
73. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLAssICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:
LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 12 (1998).
74. Id. at 91.
75. Id. at 98-100.
76. Id.
77. There is some disagreement over the extent to which judges and lawyers
understood their roles as applying natural law as opposed to embracing an instru-
mental view of the law. Compare G. Edward White,JudicialActivism and the Identity of
the Legal Profession, in INTERVENTION AND DETACHMENT: ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY
AND JURISPRUDENCE 222, 225-26 (1994) (describing nineteenth-century legal the-
ory as limiting judges' role to that of enforcing an objective body of discoverable
principles), and LAIPANA, supra note 41, at 29-38 (arguing that nineteenth-century
legal thought emphasized law as a science of natural principles), with HoRwrrz,
supra note 24, at 30 (depicting legal theory in the nineteenth century as embracing
law as a means of bringing about social change), and Robert W. Gordon, Critical
Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 59-67 (1984) (describing dominant vision of
law as facilitating natural evolution of society towards progressive goals), and
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 77 (1977) (claiming that because of
the uncertainty in law, judges inevitably considered impact on social or economic
conditions in formulating common law). For an effort to reconcile these two posi-
tions, see Feldman, supra note 45, at 1404-08. For the purposes of this Article, it is
important thatjudges at the very least used natural law rhetoric tojustify their role,
instrumental or otherwise.
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comes, independent of the person whose job was to implement it.
78
The ideal of a judge whose passion for justice drove his rational
understanding of the law gave way to a vision of a judge who set
emotion aside and relied entirely on reason to achieve the proper
result.
This new formalism was built around the idea of law as sci-
ence. 79 Precedent, like facts, could be sorted and classified so that
every decision would flow ineluctably from those that came before
it. Principles could be deduced from cases and applied to new
cases to reveal the necessary and appropriate outcomes.80 Those
who embraced the scientific view of the law believed that they
could, and indeed must, extricate idiosyncrasies of the human
mind, rendering the process ofjudging scientific and predictable. 81
This formalistic view of the law made the distinction between
reason and sentiment more pronounced. While a few decades ear-
lier the perfect judge was believed to balance reason with a passion
for justice, post-Civil War jurists placed a new premium on reason
standing alone. In other words, they believed passion and emotion
had no place in the law. As the Supreme Court put it in 1866:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did
not allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so nec-
essary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question.
Then, considerations of safety were mingled with the exercise
of power; and feelings and interests prevailed which are hap-
pily terminated. Now that the public safety is assured, this
question, as well as all others, can be discussed and decided
without passion or the admixture of any element not required
to form a legal judgment.
8 2
Similarly, in an 1896 discussion of the rules prohibiting judges
from commenting on evidence, the Court maintained that judges
must heed "the line which separates the impartial exercise of the
judicial function from the region of partisanship where reason is
disturbed, passions excited, and prejudices ... necessarily called
into play."8 3 In drawing the stark divide between reason and pas-
sion, the Court equated emotion with bias. The Court resorted to
this dichotomy not only for practical purposes but also to draw a
78. HoRwrrz, supra note 2, at 9-10.
79. See WIECEK, supra note 73, at 91; Nelson, supra note 70, at 560-64.
80. WIECEK, supra note 73, at 91.
81. Id.
82. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 109 (1866).
83. Hickory v. U.S., 160 U.S. 408, 425 (1896).
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distinction between the judiciary and the political branches while
justifying and exalting the former.
8 4
Ironically, but perhaps not incidentally, the image of the judge
as mechanical, deciding cases without resort to emotion or personal
opinion, intensified just as judges were entrusted with more power.
Part of preserving predictability in the law involved shifting deci-
sions from jury to judge. 5 Thus, late-nineteenth-century formalism
favored objective over subjective tests, abandoning fact-intensive in-
quiries into the intentions of the parties and relying on legal stan-
dards of what a reasonable person would have intended. 6 These
standards meant that more issues were decided by judges as matters
of law rather than by juries as questions of credibility or fact.
8 7
In its effort to mechanize the law, post-Civil War formalism
banished passion and emotion from the process.88 As Cyrus North-
rop, a post-war conservative lawyer and scholar, explained: "Passion
may clamor as it often does, for ex post facto laws, for laws which
involve a violation of the obligation of contracts, or for laws which
impair freedom of thought or speech or religion; but the Courts
throw all such laws out as fast as an abnormal legislature can pass
them."89 Picking up and running with the secondary meaning of
84. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 220 (1895) (in deciding what force
and effect to give to foreign judgments, the Court discusses various approaches
taken by foreign nations, including, in the absence of a governing treaty, why the
judiciary rather than the executive is best suited to determine if reciprocity exists
between the courts of different nations).
85. HoRwrrz, supra note 24, at 28-29.
86. Id. at 197-98.
87. See William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power,
1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 339 (1969).
88. The shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy, the migration to
the cities, the rush of women workers into the market, immigration, and emanci-
pation all seemed to bode ill for the security of both the new and the old American
elite. See, e.g., ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT OF WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 75-110 (1982); JOANNE J. MEYEROWITZ, WOMEN
ADRIFT: INDEPENDENT WAGE EARNERS IN CHICAGO, 1880-1930, at 140 (1991); DAVID
F. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE
CAPITALISM 58 (1977); ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at
12-21 (1967). The series of economic depressions culminating in the Panic of
1893 were followed by serious labor unrest, which in turn invited a massive display
of government force, fueling the sense of unease. See, e.g., DAVID MONTGOMERY,
THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN
LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925, at 48, 346 (1987). Formalists reacted with a system of
thought designed to impose order on the chaos. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 2,
at 188; WIECEK, supra note 73, at 123-24.
89. CYRUS NORTHROP, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AS A CONSERVATIVE FORCE IN
OUR REPUBLIC, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE GRADUATING CLASSES AT THE
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judicial independence developed after the Revolution, namely that
judges should stand above the popular fray, courts and judges grew
to stand for reason against passion, for a salutary break on the
mindlessness of the mob.90 By branding the legislature both "pas-
sionate" and "abnormal," Northrop equated legislative passion with
disease, and the law, stripped of all emotion, with the cure.9' Judi-
cial decisions were seen to "come like the answer to an algebraic
problem without partiality, even as the unknown quantities in the
problem are subjected to the operation of undeviating mathemati-
cal principles in order to determine their value."92 Predictability
became the goal of the legal system, and any display of emotion by
judges was seen as anathema.
In this world, judges became human calculators, and justice
depended on the complete suppression of all idiosyncratic person-
ality that might interfere with this pristine process:
If there is any departure from this absolute impartiality and
impersonality in the administration of justice, it is no fault of
the system, no fault of the law, but the fault of the men who
represent and administer justice, either because they are un-
worthy to preside in the temple of justice, or, being worthy,
they are yet incapable of becoming mere intellectual and judi-
cial machines, but are men still in spite of being judges.
93
Thus, passion, emotion, and personality in a judge grew to re-
present the very forces threatening to destroy judicial indepen-
dence as it had come to be defined under formalist theory.94 In
particular, passion, emotion, and personality represented the
prejudices and infirmities of the people as opposed to the wisdom
embodied in reasoned application of the law.
Under the new formalist jurisprudence, judicial independence
grew to denote the special role of the judicial branch defined by its
special form of legal reasoning. The individual independence of
judges now required not simply financial security but the suppres-
sion of passion and personality. This remained a necessary condi-
tion to the independence of the branch. The judiciary would be
distinct from the political branches precisely because judges were
able to ascertain the meaning of the law by suppressing their own
SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNIVERSARY OF YALE LAW SCHOOL (June 28th, 1892), reprinted in AD-
DRESSES: EDUCATIONAL AND PATRIOTIC 90 (1910).
90. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
91. NORTHROP, supra note 89, at 90.
92. Id. at 91.
93. Id. at 91-92.
94. Id.
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presuppositions. Such suppression necessarily promoted the inde-
pendence of the judicial branch by demonstrating its distance and
immunity from the other two branches.
According to formalist legal theory, "[(t]he distinction between
a judicial and a legislative act is well defined. The one determines
what the law is,... the other prescribes what the law shall be ... "95
Thus, the very nature of legal reasoning, the special scientific field
devoted to discerning the meaning of the law, became the guaran-
tee of independence for the judicial branch. Only the legislature
was entitled to consider the "abstract justice and equity" of a situa-
tion while "'U] ustice and equity,' for the courts, mean merely con-
formity to the law."96 In this world, impartiality (defined as
impersonality) was a necessary prerequisite to judicial indepen-
dence not only because it allowed the individual judge to properly
determine the just result, but also because it allowed the judicial
branch to perform its job of determining the meaning of existing
law.
II.
THE APPEARANCE OF IMPARTIALITY: THE
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
In the early part of the twentieth century, an elite group within
the bar used pronouncements about judicial ethics and judicial
courtesy to convince the general population that judges were, in
fact, impartial. Thus, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, published in
1924, became a way to counter growing critique that judges were
merely partisans in an increasingly hostile class war.97 By urging
judges to be courteous, the drafters argued, the Canons would help
convince skeptics that judges were mechanically applying set law in
a scientific fashion rather than drawing on their own class biases to
rule in favor of one set of interests against another. The Judicial
Canons responded to a perceived crisis in confidence in the judici-
ary. The Canons' emphasis on the appearance of impartiality gen-
erally and judicial courtesy in particular seemed the proper
remedy.
95. William Hamilton Cowles, The Distinction Between Legislative and Judicial
Power, 40 Am. L. REG. 433, 437 (1892) (quoting The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S.
700, 761 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting)).
96. Id. at 444.
97. 48 A.B.A. REP. 452-60 (1923); CANONS OFJJUDICAa. Emaics (1924).
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A. Perceived Crisis in the Legitimacy of the Courts
Formalism, with its theory of a superhuman judicial machinery,
did not last very long. Almost from its inception, the idea of a co-
herent, predictable legal science caved under the pressure of its
own inconsistencies. All it took was a few intelligent critics at the
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries
to reveal the internal contradictions. 98 Following the early steps of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., progressive legal reformers demon-
strated that law was not a science, and the premises of legal formal-
ism could not hold. The judge's policy preferences, his intuitive
sense of justice, and equities of the case always played a pivotal
role.99
In 1881, Holmes began his book The Common Law with the
phrase "[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experi-
ence."100 By 1897, Holmes' theory of the law had matured, as he
argued that almost all judicial decisions previously understood as
dictated by logic were, in fact, driven by legislative policy: "I think
that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is
inevitable. .. ."101 In 1913, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld published a
highly influential article in the Yale LawJournal explaining that not
all legal relations are capable of being reduced to discrete
categories.' 0
2
Central to this mounting critique of classical jurisprudence was
a growing conviction that judges exercise discretion in determining
cases; they do not simply apply the law in a mechanical fashion but
rather create it. Benjamin N. Cardozo gave a moderate voice to this
critique in a series of lectures at Yale, which were ultimately pub-
lished as a single volume in 1921. Cardozo criticized legal formal-
ism, acknowledging that he accepted 'judge-made law as one of the
existing realities of life."103 He reconciled this observation with the
rule of law by concluding,
98. See HORW1TZ, supra note 2, at 53; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE,
1927-1960, at 49-54 (1986). See generally PURCELL, supra note 2, at 74-94; JOHN
HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).
99. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1929).
100. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1891).
101. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457,
467 (1897).
102. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-32 (1913).
103. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).
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The eccentricities of judges balance one another. One judge
looks at problems from the point of view of history, another
from that of philosophy, another from that of social utility, one
is a formalist, another a latitudinarian, one is timorous of
change, another dissatisfied with the present; out of the attri-
tion of diverse minds there is beaten something which has a
constancy and uniformity and average value greater than its
component elements.
104
Pragmatism and a kind of social Darwinism affected not only
the jurisprudential debate but also the image of the ideal judge.10 5
By 1929, Joseph C. Hutcheson took this assumption to its logical
conclusion: "to ... great judging, the imaginative, the intuitional
faculty is essential."106
Just as the early Realists were exposing the faults in the intellec-
tual structure of classical legal science, the courts were experienc-
ing very practical incursions on their jurisdiction and threats to
their legitimacy. The progressive reform movement comprised a
fairly motley crew. Among its ranks were legal reformers who were
committed not only to proving the errors of legal formalism's ways
but also to the progressive social goals of the movement.107 Amidst
the various reform agendas was an anti-corruption campaign that
extended, in part, to the courts.' 0 8 Rather than policing abuses in
party politics, the reformers insisted, judges had become part of the
problem. As adamantly as jurists might insist on law as science and
the rule of law as distinct from politics, the corruption scandals that
104. Id. at 177.
105. See ANDREw L. KAuFMAN, CARDozo 32, 39 (1998); Louis MENAND, THE
METAPHYSICAL CLUB 337-75 (2001) (explaining the intellectual roots of
pragmatism).
106. Hutcheson, supra note 99, at 288. Drawing from this conclusion, Hutch-
eson suggested that law schools ought to devote more time to developing these
faculties and understanding how they operate. The law and emotion "movement"
has in a certain way taken up this task, devoting itself to the study of the role of
emotion within the law, legal theory, and decision making. See Maroney, supra
note 9, at 121-23.
107. See, e.g., HORW1TZ, supra note 2, at 188, 210; KALMAN, supra note 98, at
45-46.
108. MICHAELJ. POWELL, FROM PATRICiAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TR.ANS-
FORMATION OF THE NEw YORK CITY BAR AssociArion 18-28 (1988). For a general
discussion of progressive era reforms, see, for example, ALLEN F. DAVIS,
SPEARHEADS FOR REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVE-
MENT, 1890-1914 (1984); RIcHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN
TO F.D.R 197 (1955); N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins ofReaisicJuiprudence:
A Prequel to the Lkwellyn-Pound Exchange Over Legal Realism, 1989 DuKE LJ. 1302,
1307.
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dominated the headlines suggested that some judges were not only
human but also tragically so.' 0 9 They were just as susceptible to
bribes and promises of future rewards as any politician or civil
servant."I 0
Perhaps the legal establishment could have lived with the theo-
retical assault on the purely scientific nature of the law, but reform-
ers posed another, more direct threat to the authority of the
judiciary."' Drawing on their critique of formalism and promoting
a particular political agenda, progressives attacked classical judges
for striking down reform legislation.' 12 They argued that the courts
had become tools of the new robber barons, facilitating the concen-
tration of wealth and power at the expense of the less privileged. 113
Insisting that judges consistently invalidated reform legislation
under the guise of following the dictates of the Constitution, these
reformers suggested that the people ought to have the final
word.1 4 Thus, they introduced bills forjudicial recall that imposed
far greater review of judicial decisions, invalidated state statutes on
constitutional grounds, and made it easier to remove a judge who
issued that sort of decision. 115 In Colorado, for instance, progres-
sives successfully amended the state constitution to allow a popular
vote to review any judicial opinion declaring a statute invalid under
the state or federal constitution.116 It is no coincidence that in the
year the Canons were published, Robert M. LaFollette ran for Presi-
dent on a platform attacking the courts. Labor groups and other
progressive and populist groups rallied to the support of LaFollette,
who called for an end to the 'judicial oligarchy." 117 Among other
109. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 108, at 6-7. See generally Renee Letow Ler-
ner, From Popular Control to Independence: Reform of the Elecedjudiciaty in Boss Tweed's
New York, 15 GEO. MASON. L. REv. 109, 144-47 (2007).
110. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 108, at 6-7.
111. See EDWARD PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THEJUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY AMERICA 20 (2000). See generally WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: Popu-
LISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937
(1994).
112. See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt, Judges and Progress, OUTLOOK (N.Y.),Jan. 6,
1912, at 42-44.
113. See POWELL, supra note 108, at 3-44.
114. See, e.g., Daniel W. Baker, The Recall of Judicial Decisions, 1 GEo. LJ. 2,
1-12 (1912).
115. See Charles A. Boston, Some Conservative Views on the Judiciay and Judicial
Recall, 23 YALE LJ. 511, 511 (1914); Elihu Root, The Perils ofJudidalRecall, 18 CASE
& COMMENT 308, 312 (1911) (arguing against a judicial recall provision).
116. Jesse G. Northcutt, The Recall in Colorado, 25 GREEN BAG 372, 378 (1913).
117. LaFollette Lashes FederalJudiciary, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1922, at 1.
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things, LaFollette advocated recall of judicial decisions, including
those of the United States Supreme Court.118 Conservative groups
aligned with the bar in condemning his candidacy with horror and
rage.1
19
B. The Courtesy Rules as a Response to the Perceived Crisis
in Legitimacy
The decision to turn general principles into written guidelines
was a reaction to the attack, which had precipitated a perceived cri-
sis in the legitimacy of the judiciary. The Canons of Judicial Ethics
affirmed the importance of judicial courtesy in order to create the
appearance of an impartial judiciary. Despite the growing outcry
against the courts, the authors and proponents of the Canons did
not themselves believe that the independence and legitimacy of the
judicial branch were in jeopardy. 120 They nevertheless were reso-
lute about the need to convince an impatient and impetuous pub-
lic. They focused in important part on judicial demeanor as a way
to project an impartial image.
121
In January 1922, the American Bar Association ("ABA") cre-
ated a committee to draft rules of professional conduct for
judges.122 The Canons would be merely aspirational, and the lead-
ers of the bar hoped they would provide guidance for judges while,
more importantly, projecting a new, more wholesome image for the
judiciary. The committee, chaired by ChiefJustice William H. Taft,
consisted of fairly conservative lawyers andjudges. 123 The following
year, the committee drafted a set of thirty-four canons, which were
approved with minor edits in 1924.124
The preamble to the Canons reflected the predominant philos-
ophy of the ABA in general and the committee in particular. Be-
ginning with excerpts from Francis Bacon's Essay on Judicature, the
Canons embodied the older mechanical jurisprudence, which ex-
118. Id.
119. See Ross, supra note 111, at 273-74.
120. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
122. 48 A.B.A. REP. 454-60 (1923); 49 A.B.A. REP. 67-71 (1924).
123. 48 A.B.A. REp. 454. The American Bar Association appointed prominent
members of the bench and bar: Leslie C. Cornish, Chief Justice of the Maine Su-
preme Court; Robert von Mosechzisker, ChiefJustice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court; Charles A. Boston, a prominent New York attorney; and George Suther-
land. When President Warren Harding nominated Sutherland to serve as Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court, he was replaced by Garret W. McEnerney, a
leader of the San Francisco Bar.
124. Id.
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hortedjudges to be impartial, to suppress their individual personal-
ities, and to find the preexisting law (not make it).125 The
preamble drew on Bacon to translate this jurisprudence into a pre-
scribed judicial style: "Judges ought to be more learned than witty;
more reverend than plausible; and more advised than confi-
dent."1 26 The quotations elaborated: "Patience and gravity of hear-
ing is an essential part of justice; and an over speaking judge is no
well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace to a judge first to find that which
he might have heard in due time from the bar... ,"127 Under the
heading "Essential Conduct," Canon Six read: "He should be tem-
perate, attentive, patient, impartial, and since he is to administer
the law and apply it to the facts, he should be studious of the princi-
ples of the law and diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts."
1 28
Canon Eleven also urged a judge to be considerate of jurors and
witnesses, and Canon Twelve, captioned "Courtesy and Civility,"
stated that judges should be courteous to counsel and others.12 9
The Canons consisted largely of rules of judicial demeanor, which
would project impartiality and assure the public that judges were
applying the law scientifically as opposed to deciding cases based on
their own predilection.
The Canons affirmed the importance of judicial indepen-
dence, defining it as freedom from the pressures of the public.
Considerably less concerned about executive control over the judi-
ciary, the Canons reflected a growing sense of independence as
freedom from the unthinking trends of the masses. Canon Four-
teen read: "Independence. A judge should not be swayed by partisan
demands, public clamor, or considerations of personal popularity
or notoriety, nor be apprehensive of unjust criticism."' 3 0 Canon
Thirty-Four made this meaning even more explicit: "[A judge]
should be ... impartial, fearless of public clamor, regardless of pub-
lic praise, and indifferent to private political or partisan
influences."
1 3 1
The emphasis on courtesy grew directly from the older formal-
istjudicial philosophy. The premise was that personality of ajudge
125. AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF COMMrrrEE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS (1923)
("Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere not jus dare; to interpret
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should be excluded in the mechanical application of justice. Re-
jecting Cardozo's earlier insight, one proposed canon stated: 'Jus-
tice should not be molded by the individual idiosyncrasies of those
administering it."1S2 The emphasis on ritual took on new urgency
as its proponents perceived rapid changes in their environment. In
1924, Judge Caroll T. Bond of the Maryland Supreme Court noted:
And as men tend to harmonize with their surroundings and
the attitude of others, we even have to keep up with care such
things as parliamentary behavior in the courts, and for the up-
keep small ceremonials may be of greater importance than we
usually realize. The impersonal relation of the judge to the
case before him is of very great importance, and some of us
fear there may be a giving of ground in such a little thing as
the drift toward direct personal address to the judge in the
course of trial, which is sometimes seen in Baltimore City.'33
The rules concerning judicial comportment, according to this
judge, were more than mere etiquette guidelines. They compen-
sated for the chaos and unfamiliarity of the new urban landscape.
They warded off the alien cultures that came with it. Judge Bond
contended:
The personal touch in judicature may be a blighting touch.
Perhaps it is only by preserving the conception of a court of
justice as something larger than the men who carry it on, as
something which transcends them, and compels their rever-
ence, that the ground gained through the centuries and left to
us of the later generations, can be held secure. 1s4
In other words, the rule of law ought to be more than the sum
of its administrators.13 5 The perceived threat to the value of the
judiciary along with the sense of instability generally prompted
some to publicize this premise and project this conservative image
in the form of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
More than a reiteration of the formalist ideology, the Canons
represented a response to the perceived attack on the legitimacy of
the judicial branch. As one jurist put it: "The judicial functions,
which until recently were regarded with a reverence approaching
132. Editorial, Proposed Canons ofJudicial Ethics, 27 LAw NOTES 1, 1 (1923); 9
A.B.A. J. 189, 191 (1923) (quoting PROPOSED CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon
21).
133. Judge Carroll T. Bond, The Growth of Judicial Ethics, Address before
the Maryland State Bar Association (June 24, 1924).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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awe, are being subjected to sharp analysis and criticism."15 6 To
counter the increasingly credible critiques by jurists like Holmes
and popular figures like LaFollette, the appearance of impartiality
was at least as important as impartiality itself. So Chief Justice Wil-
liam H. Taft wrote: "The appearance of justice in the courts, espe-
cially in these times when demagoguery and sincere ignorance are
united in an unjust attack upon our courts, is profoundly neces-
sary."' 3 7 The Canons were designed in part as a public relations
campaign. Its authors did not doubt, at least not out loud, that
most judges were in fact impartial, interpreting and not inventing
the law. Sensing, however, that they were losing ground, it appears
they felt the need to project that reality by codifying it.
After launching a defense of the judiciary, its use of the injunc-
tion to prevent strikes and of the Fourteenth Amendment to invali-
date reform legislation, Charles Boston, a prominent lawyer and
member of the committee charged with drafting the Canons,
explained:
It is not semi-monastic solitude, traditional veneration of the
Constitution, or a natural instinct to preserve property rights,
which has weakened the Judiciary, but the fact that the people
were not individually impressed with the wonderful integrity,
the amazing ability, the great industry and the utter impartial-
ity of the Bench.'
5 8
The real problem, as Boston saw it, was that in their ignorance,
people blamed the individual judge instead of the law.139 His
choice of the word "bench" rather than judge is illustrative of his
desire to render the process impersonal. According to Boston, the
public blamed the courts because the public was unwilling to accept
that the law, and the good of all, often favored the wealthy, more
powerful classes. He argued that it is "easier to abuse a judge than
to change a Constitution, " 140 and believed that the crisis in the le-
gitimacy of the judiciary was not a matter of judicial overreaching
but rather the product of a few bad seeds ruining the image of the
entire branch. He concluded that the bar needed rules that would
136. W.F. Dodd, Social Lidslation and the Courts, 28 POL. SCi. Q. 1, 1 (1913).
137. William H. Taft, Lga Ethics, 2 B.U. L. REv. 71, 83 (1922).
138. Boston, supra note 115, at 528.
139. Id. at 512. Taft made the same argument in an article on the Federal
Judiciary, claiming that people perceived the courts as taking sides in class warfare,
when, in fact, they were merely interpreting a law that in the end served the inter-
est of all classes. William H. Taft, Charges Against the FederaIJudiciary, 1 VA. L. REG.
389,411 (1895).
140. Boston, supra note 115, at 520.
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make even the bad judges look good. This, in turn, would make it
more difficult for the public to confuse the harsh realities of the
Constitution with judicial bias.'
4 '
In addition to the defense of formalism, the new Canons with
their emphasis on judicial temperament and style sought to portray
judges as gentlemen, a subtle but forceful rebuke to immigrants in
both the legal profession and on the bench.142 Professor Jerome
Auerbach has argued that the late-nineteenth-century bar was strug-
gling to resist the implication of diversity among its ranks. 143 The
new wave of immigrants was not only joining the general popula-
tion, it was also beginning to seep into the profession. Auerbach
demonstrates that the bar fought hard to close ranks. It developed
rules against advertising, contingency fees, and solicitation-all in a
somewhat futile attempt to cleanse the profession of its new
members.144
By attempting to banish emotional expression through rules
against discourtesy and intemperance, the authors of the Canons
were acting to exclude a more colorful style of judging associated
with ethnic minorities. At the very least, it was fighting to guarantee
that the ideal judge would not look like these newcomers. Thus,
one commentator on the new Canons mentioned the importance
of projecting an image of the judiciary as "gentlem [anly]."145 A
judge explained it as follows:
Like a bishop, a judge should be the husband of but one wife,
and of affinities he should be very wary. He should not lead
the life of a roisterer, carouse in taverns or other questionable
resorts, or associate with persons of known evil life. He should
never seek political preferment while still occupying the
bench.146
Reminiscent of images of the urban world with its political ma-
chines, this commentary picked up on the language of the moral
141. See id. at 527-28.
142. For a discussion of a similar effort to cleanse the bar of the new immi-
grant class, see JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA 43-49 (1976).
143. Id. at 106-30.
144. Id. at 43-48.
145. Russell Benedict, Ethics of the Bench, 8 A.B.A.J. 199, 201 (1922).
146. J. Jesse Holdom, The Ethics of the Bench, A Paper Read Before the Illi-
nois State Bar Association at Chicago (June 25, 1908), in CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June
27, 1908, at 369.
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reform movement of the time, proselytizing middle-class mores as
the solution to the urban iniquity spread by new ethnic groups.
14 7
The campaign to portray judges as gentlemanly, impartial, and
impersonal administrators of the law came just as the actual role of
judges was moving in the opposite direction. Meeting the needs of
turn-of-the-century urban America, trial judges began to play a
more active and personal role in proceedings. 148 New sorts of trials
and cases in the early part of the twentieth century began to replace
simple disputes. The adversarial proceeding between two individu-
als grew to be the exception rather than the rule. 149 Cases grew to
be more complex, involving social welfare agencies, parole offices,
corporations, and multiple groups of litigants. 150 New courts
emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century that were designed
to immerse themselves in a community and solve problems in a
more holistic way.' 51 For example, the first juvenile court, which
opened in Illinois in 1899, drew on the new social sciences to derive
solutions to the difficult problems involving children in urban
America. 152 These changes demanded that judges play a more ac-
tive and personal role in the proceedings.1 53 In the face of this new
trend, the campaign to project an appearance of impartiality seems
like a rearguard effort to resist the pressures drawing lower court
judges into the turmoil.
In the 1920s, the judicial elite saw the Canons as a way of pro-
jecting an accurate image of the judiciary as a separate branch, re-
taining legitimacy because of the unique nature of legal reasoning.
They believed that the Canons would cause the public to see what
the authors already knew to be true: thatjudges, through their spe-
cial training and abilities, discern the meaning of the law but do
not make it. In other words, courts were seen as legitimate and
independent because of the scientific nature of legal reasoning,
which ensured a government of laws, not of men. In the 1920s, the
image of a detached and impartial judge enshrined in the Canons
served as a sign for the public that this was, indeed, the case.
147. See generally PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA,
1820-1920 (1978).
148. See generally DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING
(2004); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE
ERA CHICAGO (2003).
149. See generally W11RICH, supra note 148.
150. See generally id.
151. See generally id.
152. See TANENHAUS, supra note 148, at xxiv.
153. See generally WILuLCH, supra note 148.
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III.
THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY:
THE 1972 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Fifty years after the adoption of the Canons, in 1972, the ABA
adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct to replace its earlier set of
rules regarding judicial behavior. 154 With the development ofjudi-
cial branch self-regulation through the establishment of judicial
commissions authorized to sanction individual judges for miscon-
duct, the new rules were enacted to be enforceable, not merely ad-
visory. Their adoption coincided with, and reflected, changing
ideas of the judicial role and judicial independence.
By the 1970s, the jurisprudential tides had turned, and most
jurists recognized that judges are involved in making the law, and
that they bring to the bench ideologies, preconceptions, and intu-
itions.155 Most scholars, judges, and lawyers acknowledged that ju-
dicial reasoning was not categorically different from political
reasoning. As one contemporary put it, "[t]o continue to insist
upon calling a judge a neutral automaton, when all human experi-
ence refutes that notion, is to be willfully blind."15 6 Rather than
admit that moral authority derived from some source other than
the special nature of legal reasoning, the bar in the early 1970s
compensated for the loss of such absolutes with sociological rheto-
ric. Max Weber famously explained that bureaucratization involves
the "abstract regularity of the exercise of authority."157 The 1972
Code ofJudicial Conduct marked the bureaucratization of the judi-
ciary: the use of rules and procedures to impose an impersonal and
regular form of justice. Unlike the authors of the Canons, who
used the statement of abstract aspirations to project what they be-
lieved to be the reality, the ABA designed the rules to actually effect
this purpose.
With the goal of bureaucratization in mind, detachment of the
judicial branch-as contrasted with detachment of individual
154. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972) (amended 2007).
155. E.g., Rondal G. Downing, Judicial Ethics and the Political Role of the Courts,
35 LAw & CONTEMP. PRaos. 94, 105 (1970); Arthur Selwyn Miller, Public Confidence
in the Judiciay: Some Notes and ReJlctions, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 87 (1970);
J. Harvie Wilkinson II, John P. MacKenzie's The Appearance ofJustice, 60 VA. L. Rxv.
1103, 1103 (1974) (book review).
156. Miller, supra note 155, at 91.
157. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10
CARDozo L. REv. 3, 18 (1988) (citing MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SociETY 983
(1978)). Elaborating on Weber's theory, Justice Brennan observed that "the bu-
reaucratic model of authority... aspires ultimately to banish passion from govern-
ment altogether, and establish a state where only reason will reign." Id.
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judges-grew to define judicial independence. This sort of bureau-
cratic separation became the source of legitimacy for the judiciary.
Given the growingly elusive nature of the rule of law, the central
way to secure the independence of the judicial branch seemed to
be to prevent bias and partisan politics from infiltrating the judici-
ary. This separation of function replaced the special nature of legal
reasoning as the source of legitimacy for the judiciary. The Code,
unlike the Canons that came before, licensed some judges and ad-
ministrators to impose uniformity on others. It recognized and per-
petuated a hierarchy and internal order, which manufactured the
image of impersonal justice for very different reasons from those
advanced in 1924.
The new rules against discourtesy and intemperate conduct
were remnants of an older conception of personal judicial indepen-
dence. They were carried over without much deliberation even
though they failed to promote the prevailing concern of branch
independence, nor did they comport with the creative new under-
standing of personal independence expressed by Justices Black and
Douglas. What they did do was provide a way for judges and others
who staffed state judicial commissions to police the judiciary, en-
forcing a uniformity of style in keeping with the bureaucratic
model. This Part provides background to the drafting of the Code
of Judicial Ethics, explains the perceived crises that prompted the
bar to make the ethical rules binding, and reviews the competing
conceptions of independence. It then analyzes how the Code at-
tempted to address the prevailing concerns and the role that the
courtesy rules played in this strategy.
A. Background
In 1939, Congress established judicial councils for federal
courts composed of circuit and district court judges along with
members of the bar. The purpose of these bodies was largely ad-
ministrative. They were designed to give the courts a mechanism to
improve efficiency and the administration of justice.158
Shortly thereafter, New York and California established judicial
discipline commissions to investigate and sanction judges for mis-
conduct. In 1948, New York established a Court on the Judiciary.
Twelve years later, California established an agency called the Com-
mission on Judicial Qualifications. Both were authorized to engage
158. An Act to Provide for the Administration of the United States Courts, ch.
501, §§ 306-307, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224-25 (1939); H.R. REP. No. 76-702, at 1-2
(1939).
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in confidential hearings to investigate complaints aboutjudges, and
to recommend appropriate action-including censure or re-
moval-to the state supreme court.159 By 1970, twenty-five states
had adopted similar procedures to deal with judicial misconduct.16°
As the 1960s progressed, the public grew more attentive to ju-
dicial corruption.' 6' A series of scandals late in the decade precipi-
tated the drafting of the Code as a set of rules meant to be
enforceable by judicial commissions, not simply precatory. Ethical
scandals surrounded the failure of the nominations of Abe Fortas
and Clement Haynsworth to serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.' 62 And more allegations of unethical conduct drove the
House minority leader Gerald Ford's effort to impeach Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas in 1970.163 Meanwhile, in 1966, SenatorJoseph D.
Tydings of Maryland, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Improve-
ments in the Judicial Machinery, held hearings to investigate
problems with the administration of justice. 164 The product of
159. William T. Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and How Four States Deal With
It, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 151, 155 (1970).
160. Id.
161. John H. Holloman III, The Judicial Reform Act: Histoy, Analysis, and Com-
ment, 35 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 128, 133-34 (1970) (discussing the increasing
public awareness ofjudicial corruption in the 1960s); see al5oJOSEPH BORKIN, THE
CORRUPTJUDGE 120, 207-08 (1962) (describing prior instances ofjudicial corrup-
tion and proposing a method for dealing with judicial misconduct).
162. In 1968, when Earl Warren announced his retirement as Chief Justice,
President Johnson nominated his close friend and adviser, Associate Justice Abe
Fortas, to take Warren's place. The confirmation hearings revealed that while serv-
ing on the Court, Fortas had regularly attended White House staff meetings, had
revealed details of Court deliberations to the President, and had pressured Sena-
tors who opposed the Vietnam War to be more compliant. Adding fuel to growing
opposition to Fortas's appointment was the revelation that Fortas had been receiv-
ing a $15,000 salary to teach a summer course at American University. President
Johnson ultimately withdrew the nomination when he realized that he lacked the
votes to end a filibuster. The following year, Fortas resigned from the Court upon
the discovery that he was receiving a yearly stipend of $20,000 from Wall Street
financier Louis Wolfson, who was under investigation for securities fraud. See Hol-
loman, supra note 161, at 136; LAuRA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (1992).
In addition, President Nixon's nomination of Clement Haynsworth for Chief Jus-
tice foundered upon allegations that Haynsworth had supported segregation, and
as a lower-courtjudge had rendered decisions that advanced his financial interests.
See Stephen L. Wasby & Joel Grossman, Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.: A New Per-
spective on His Nomination to the Supreme Court, 1990 DuKE L. J. 74, 75-77.
163. Ford moved to impeach Justice William 0. Douglas based on Douglas's
connection with, and supplemental income from, the Albert Parvin Foundation,
which allegedly had ties to organized crime. See JAMEs F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT
JouRN . THE LIF OF WiuimA 0. DOUGLAS 392, 398 (1980).
164. Holloman, supra note 161, at 135.
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these hearings, the proposed Judicial Reform Act, would have cre-
ated a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, composed
of five federal judges, to be appointed by the Chief Justice.
165 If
four members of the Commission found that a judge's conduct was
inconsistent with the "good behavior" standard, the Commission
would recommend removal to the Judicial Conference, a body of
federal judges responsible for adopting rules for the administration
of the United States Courts. 166 The bill would have empowered the
Judicial Conference to remove the judge subject to discretionary
review by the Supreme Court.167 By 1970, Tydings' bill had earned
the support of the ABA and the Nixon administration, but was de-
feated by strong opposition from Senator Sam Ervin and others.
168
In 1969, Bernard Segal, the President of the ABA, appointed a spe-
cial committee on the standards of judicial conduct to revise the
Canons of Judicial Ethics. 169
In 1970, the Supreme Court itself was confronted with the
question of how extensively the judicial councils could regulate in-
165. SamJ. Ervin,Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 108, 123 (1970). See generally Comment, The Limitations of Artice I on
the ProposedJudicial Removal Maczhinry: S. 1506, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1064 (1970).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1948); see also, Todd David Peterson, Congressional Inves-
tigations of Federal Judges, 90 IowA L. REv. 1, 29-49 (2004). The Judicial Confer-
ence, formerly known as the Conference of Senior CircuitJudges, was founded in
1922. For a full history of the Judicial Conference, see Judith Resnick, Constricting
Remedies: The RehnquistJudiciaiy, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 272-90
(2003).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1948). There was a constitutional debate as to whether
a federal judge could be removed in any manner short of impeachment. Tydings
and other proponents of the bill argued that because Article III, § 1 of the Consti-
tution demanded only that they hold their offices "during good Behaviour,"judges
could be removed for failing to live up to a higher standard by methods other than
impeachment. Holloman, supra note 161, at 135.
168. Holloman, supra note 161, at 142-43.
169. Chaired by RobertJ. Traynor, retired ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court
of California, the committee consisted of prominent lawyers, judges, and law
professors, including United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, United
States CircuitJudge Irving R. Kaufman, and Professor Geoffrey Hazard of Yale Law
School. The other members of the committee were Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., a
lawyer from Tennessee, E. Dixie Beggs, a lawyer from Florida, Edward T. Gignoux,
Chief Judge of the United States District Court of Maine, James K. Groves, Justice
of the Supreme Court of Colorado, Ivan Lee Holt, Jr., a Judge in Missouri appel-
late court, Robert A. Leflar, Professor at the Arkansas Law School, William L. Mar-
bury, a lawyer in Maryland, George H. Revelle, a Judge of the appellate court in
Washington, Whitney North Seymour, a lawyer in New York, W.O. Shafer, a lawyer
in Texas, and Edward L. Wright, a lawyer in Arkansas. The Reporter was E. Wayne
Thode, a professor at Utah College of Law. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NoTEs
TO CODE OFJUDICIAL CoNDUCr (1973).
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dividualjudges. In 1966, the Judicial Council for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stripped Judge Stephen
Chandler of all his pending cases and prevented assignment of new
cases until further review,170 though eventually, the Council agreed
to return to Chandler his pending cases but to assign no new cases.
In response to Chandler's challenge to this decision, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, cryptically dismissed the petition
on grounds that Chandler had not "made a case for the extraordi-
nary relief" he sought. 171 Burger reasoned that Chandler agreed to
the order, thereby waiving the right to relief. Had he withheld con-
sent, further proceedings would have been available. 172 In a dissent
joined by Justice Black, Justice Douglas argued that Chandler's con-
sent was irrelevant because the order unconstitutionally interfered
with the independence of the judiciary.'
73
B. Reasons for the Code ofJudicial Conduct
The authors and proponents of the Code of Judicial Ethics
cited all the recent controversy along with a more generalized dis-
trust of government as among the causes of a growing lack of confi-
dence in the judiciary.17 4 In discussing the need for enforceable
judicial ethics rules, Rondal G. Downing, a professor of political sci-
ence, explained:
The sense of malaise that settled over much of America during
the last part of the 1960s appears to be broadening and deep-
ening as we enter the 1970s. Unease continues to be reflected
in the attitudes that Americans have toward their nation, its
problems and its prospects for the future. These attitudes
alone constitute a problem of formidable dimensions reflect-
ing as they do a widespread lack of confidence in virtually every
170. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. (Chandler
I), 398 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1970). Chandler challenged the first order in the Su-
preme Court in 1966, but the Supreme Court denied his petition on the ground
that the order was interlocutory, pending further proceedings before the council.
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 382 U.S. 1003,
1003-04 (1966).
171. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 89.
172. Id. at 87.
173. See id. at 136-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
174. See, e.g., Irving R. Kaufman, Lions orJackals: The Function of a Code ofJudi-
cialEthics, 35 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3-4 (1970) (remarking that the furor over
the Fortas controversy had by then turned to substantive proposals for revised ca-
nons ofjudicial ethics); George Edwards, Commentary onJudicialEthics, 38 FoRe HAM
L. REv. 259, 260-63 (1969); Wilkinson, supra note 155, at 1103; Downing, supra
note 155, at 94.
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American institution, especially political and governmental
institutions. 
175
The judicial branch had escaped the 1960s relatively unscathed for
a few years because of the Supreme Court's civil rights record and
its position of relative moral authority following Watergate, but the
courts were soon caught in the anti-government rhetoric.
176
The allegations of financial impropriety leveled at Fortas,
Haynsworth, and Douglas did more than simply cast a shadow on
the particular justices involved; they also exacerbated complaints
about a highly politicized Court in a highly politicized time and
provided fodder for proponents of the Code. Contemporary com-
mentary lamented that the courts had become so embroiled in the
segregation battle that they were seen as a political battleground.'
77
Proponents of a new code of ethics for judges saw the trial of the
Chicago Seven, the defendants charged in relation to the protests
surrounding the Democratic National Convention in 1968, as evi-
dence of the devolution ofjustice. 178 The trial swept courts into the
then-diminished repute of all government institutions.' 79 As in the
1920s, the suspicion of the judiciary was characterized by a sense
that courts had become as politicized as the other branches of gov-
ernment.180 As Downing argued, courts were drawn into the most
politically troubled waters since Brown.'81
175. Downing, supra note 155, at 94; see also Tom C. Clark, Judicial Seyf-Regula-
tion-Its Potential, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 37 (1970) ('Faith in the Estab-
lishment and the personalities that people it has been increasingly on our minds in
the last half decade of the sixties. Indeed our young people have hammered home
the idea that all is not well with either the Establishment or those who operate it.");
Ervin, supra note 165, at 122 ("Beyond doubt during this era of social upheaval,
there is a rather extraordinary lack of confidence in many of our governmental
institutions, including the judiciary.").
176. Wilkinson, supra note 155, at 1103.
177. Id. at 1103-04.
178. In that trial, one of the defendants called the presiding judge, Julius
Hoffman, a "pig" and a "racist," and the judge, in response, had the defendant
bound and gagged in the courtroom. At another point in the trial, two of the
defendants arrived dressed in judicial robes and blew kisses to the jury. Downing,
supra note 155, at 94-95. Commentators pointed to the trial to illustrate that the
courts had lost control and that justice seemed arbitrary and personal rather than
abstract and regular. Id.
179. Id. at 95-96.
180. Friedman, supra note 3, at 986. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE Su-
PREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
181. Downing, supra note 155, at 97. For example, courts were determining
the degree of permissible segregation and of discrimination in public education,
transportation, and housing; they were deciding the degree to which protests and
demonstrations-particularly protests against the Vietnam War-were to enjoy
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The growing disillusionment with the judiciary was accompa-
nied by changing ideas about the role of the law. Recognizing that
judges make the law, jurists acknowledged that there was no natural
divide between the political and judicial branches.18 2 They used
the courtesy rules to erect an artificial barrier in its place. As J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, then a professor at the University of Virginia
School of Law, noted, "Though we have come to expect judges to
bring to the bench decided views on constitutional policy, we have
also come to insist that they be clear of questionable financial con-
flicts or other trace [s] of ethical compromise." 83 In some ways, the
courtesy rules were seen as an antidote to the diminished public
confidence in the courts' legitimacy and the rising perception that
they were highly politicized: "It may well be the ethics of the judge
that assure his legitimacy. More and more, legislators and judge are
being drawn into the same territory."1 84 The Code's ethical pro-
scriptions served to insulate the judiciary from the political
branches; no longer to project an image of the separate branch
functions that the authors of the Canons believed existed by nature
of legal reasoning.
C. Ideas of Independence
The crisis of public confidence in the judiciary spawned a con-
versation about independence. In light of changing jurisprudential
views, however, independence shifted meanings. Most scholars in
the late 1960s and 70s understood judicial independence in terms
of detachment from the political branches, rather than personal
independence. The question that plagued contemporaries was, if
the unique nature of legal reasoning cannot naturally and logically
separate the judiciary from the legislature and executive, then what
does? Most jurists assumed that controls implemented by a central
bureaucracy would create an artificial divide, which would serve to
ensure a new kind of independence. They thought that only by
emptying out that which made him human, by putting aside emo-
tion or politics or preconceptions, could ajudge correctly ascertain
the true and just law.
In the late 1960s, the concept of branch independence domi-
nated, and most jurists simply ignored the idea of personal inde-
constitutional protection. In addition, courts were being asked such controversial
questions as how much protection should be given to pornography and obscenity
and how extensively to interpret the separation between church and state. Id.
182. See Howmrz, supra note 2, at 247-68.
183. Wilkinson, supra note 155, at 1103.
184. Id.
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pendence. The independence of individual judges, as opposed to
the judicial branch, assumed a secondary status, although a few
iconoclastic judges, including Justices Black and Douglas,
reinvented the meaning of personal independence in light of juris-
prudential changes, arguing that judges must be free to express
(rather than repress) their own political, ideological, jurispruden-
tial, or emotional views. 185 This view of personal judicial indepen-
dence, however, was in tension with branch independence and did
not significantly shape the drafting of the Judicial Code.
Charles D. Breitel, then-justice of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York, explained that it is a myth that the
three branches of government are separated based on hard-line di-
vision of powers or functions. But he wrote that there is "a desira-
ble division of power to prevent domination by any one branch or
organ of government."
1 86
Although concerned about the appearance of impartiality,
commentators were no longer preoccupied with each judge's ap-
pearing neutral and machine-like. Instead, they wanted the entire
branch to seem uniform and apolitical.18 7 The fear was no longer
that judges might allow their own preconceptions and idiosyncra-
sies to seep in, but rather that the population would perceive the
entire branch as an arm of the party in power. 18 8 AsJudge Irving R.
Kaufman, a member of the Special Committee on Standards of Ju-
dicial Conduct of the ABA, explained: "[I]mpartiality and insula-
tion from pressures by the political branches are essential attributes
of judicial power." 18 9
Virtually no one still maintained the idea that judges ought to
suppress their individual personalities to ascertain the correct
meaning of the law. Somejurists did, however, promote a new kind
of personal independence for judges. Judge Kaufman explained:
There are times when we need men who can feel and under-
stand what goes on in the world about them; we shall not find
such men in a gray "bureaucracy" divorced from all outside ac-
tivities and interests. And there are times, I might add, when
185. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text; infra notes 192-95 and
accompanying text.
186. Charles D. Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 750 (1965).
The following year Breitel was appointed to the New York Court of Appeals, where
he served as Chief Judge from 1973 to 1979.
187. See, e.g., Dean Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A.
J. 919, 920 (1969); Breitel, supra note 186.
188. Braithwaite, supra note 159, at 153.
189. Kaufman, supra note 17, at 694.
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we need men who are not afraid to roar should the occasion
demand it.190
Furthermore, the more oversight and regulation ofjudges, the
greater the danger that each judge will lose his own independent
judgment, his ability to draw on his personality, intuition, and emo-
tions to determine the just outcome of a case. 191 Justice Douglas in
his dissent in the Chandler opinion articulated this version of per-
sonal independence most passionately. He elaborated his under-
standing of judicial independence, which was quite distinct from
and in some way opposed to the dominant view of branch
independence:
An independent judiciary is one of this Nation's outstanding
characteristics. Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Sen-
ate and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge.
He commonly works with other federal judges who are likewise
sovereign. But neither one alone nor any number banded to-
gether can act as censor and place sanctions on him.
192
He explained the mood on the other side: "[S]ome federal
judges [are] opposed to this view and they are active in attempting
to make all federal judges walk in some uniform step."193 Accord-
ing to Justice Douglas, the danger of eroding this sort of personal
independence was dire because it allowed one set of judges to im-
pose their own personal views on others:
And whose "public interest" would control? Judges who have
not been educated to the needs of ecology and of conserva-
tion? Judges who still have a "plantation" state of mind and
relegate many minorities to second-class citizenship? Judges
who have a narrow view of freedom of expression or a broad
view of due process? Public issues deal with a vast contrariety
of views; and judges, like other people are to be found in all
parts of the spectrum. How under the Constitution can one
judge's lips be sealed because of the predestined view of other
judges?
194
190. Kaufman, supra note 174, at 8.
191. See, e.g., Beverly Blair Cook, Perceptions of the Independent Trial Judge Role in
the Seventh Circuit, 6 LAw & Soc'y REv. 615 (1972) (examining contrasting perspec-
tives on the increase in bureaucratic oversight of the federal judiciary during the
twentieth century).
192. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. (Chandler
H/), 398 U.S. 74, 136 (1970) (DouglasJ, dissenting).
193. Id. at 137.
194. Id. at 139-40.
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This multiplicity and diversity of judicial views, the heritage of
Cardozo's experiment in judicial styles, was, according to Justice
Douglas, the key to legitimacy for the courts. He elaborated, "Some
of the idiosyncrasies may be displeasing to those who walk in more
measured, conservative steps. But those idiosyncrasies can be of no
possible constitutional concern to other federal judges."' 95 Despite
the arguments in support of this view, 196 they were relatively ineffec-
tual at preventing the increasing bureaucratization of the judiciary,
and the Code drafters ultimately gave this emphasis on personal
independence no weight in their final product. As Senator Sam J.
Ervin explained, 'Judicial independence can just as easily be
eroded by powerful hierarchies within the judiciary itself as by
outside pressures from the legislative and executive branches of the
government."'
97
At least some members of the committee were, however, con-
cerned about the cost that the Code might have for personal inde-
pendence, as they now defined it. They were concerned about
chilling productive judicial styles and argued for a careful imple-
mentation of the Code. Judge Kaufman, for example, sought to
craft the rules so as to avoid interfering with personal indepen-
dence. He felt the rules should not comprise "wholesale prohibi-
tions," but rather guidelines, trusting the general discretion of
judges.198 He also believed it important to allow judges to engage
in extra-judicial activities to prevent 'judicial myopia in an age that
incessantly demands more independence and more understanding
to solve the increasingly complex and sensitive issues our society
leaves to be settled by litigation."1 99 He worried that additional
controls on the judiciary would invite dissatisfied litigants to harass
judges and deter them from rendering any potentially controversial
decision, "irreparably chilling fearless and impartial
adjudication."
200
195. Id. at 140-41.
196. George Edwards, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, echoed Kaufman's call: "The American judiciary is not and should
not become a grey bureaucracy completely remote from the life and the problems
of the nation." Edwards, supra note 174, at 275. He continued: "The family, the
home, the neighborhood, the school, job, marriage, military experience, travel,
friends, avocations-all inevitably become a part of the judge, just as they do of
other men. No judge can ever really disassociate himself from his origin, history,
and his present life. Nor should he try." Id. at 278.
197. Ervin, supra note 165, at 125.
198. See Kaufman, supra note 174, at 6.
199. Id. at 7.
200. Kaufman, supra note 17, at 700.
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In 1969, George Edwards, a judge on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, echoed these concerns. He argued
against the recent furor following the Fortas scandal, suggesting
that it would be a grave error to ask judges to avoid all criticism:
"Such a standard would certainly eliminate as judicial heroes such
giants of our legal history as Brandeis, Holmes, Frankfurter and
Warren."201 Thus, he argued that the Code should not require a
judge to divorce himself from the world. The robes cannot, and
should not, force a judge to rid himself of everything that makes
him human.20 2
D. Bureaucratization Through the Courtesy Rules
When the ABA convened the Special Committee on Standards
of Judicial Conduct to help codify the rules of judicial conduct, it
was concerned with how to manufacture judicial uniformity and
branch independence without faith in law as something naturally
distinct from politics. The goal of the new Code was to create bu-
reaucratic divisions between the judiciary and the political branches
of government, preventing bias in proceedings, and promoting the
efficient administration ofjustice. To that end, the authors focused
primarily on extra-judicial and quasi-judicial activities, compensa-
tion for such activities, financial and business dealings, and disquali-
fication for personal interest.
20 3
As Dean Acheson argued, branch independence required
judges to disassociate from all civic and political activity: "The most
important extra-judicial assignments distract from judicial tasks,
and lesser ones may bring involvement in controversies detracting
from judicial impartiality and aloofness."20 4 The term "aloofness"
implies an intentional separation from the affairs of the world. Ad-
vocating a kind of bureaucratic wall between the judiciary and the
political branches, Acheson criticized the Supreme Court justices
who crossed the divide. He cited ChiefJustice Warren's role presid-
ing over the commission to investigate the assassination of John F.
201. Edwards, supra note 174, at 273.
202. See id.
203. See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (June 1970), in COLLEC-
TION OF MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS COLLECTED FROM THE AMERICAN BAR ASsocIA-
TION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, 1970-72 (American
Bar Association Archive Pubs.); GENERAL REACTIONS TO THE INTERIM REPORT (Sept.
22, 1970), in COLLECTION OF MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS COLLECTED FROM THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT, 1970-72, supra; Kaufman, supra note 174, at 4-7.
204. Acheson, supra note 187, at 920.
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Kennedy, Justice Robert Jackson's service as chief American prose-
cutor at the Nuremburg trials, andJustice Goldberg's resignation to
serve as representative to the United Nations as evidence of this
insidious blurring of the line between the political extracurriculars
and the judicial function.
205
Judicial courtesy was one approach within the new rules to
build bureaucratic constraints into the judiciary. Those who en-
gaged in the limited public debate around the courtesy rules viewed
judicial demeanor as a way of projecting a judiciary free from parti-
san political agendas, a court free from clear bias. 206 An article in
Fortune Magazine put it this way:
Today, traveling through a time of exceptional stress, the U.S.
needs more than ever to be escorted by effective justice and by
serene, civilized courts. Even in the best of times, American
courts have suffered too much from politics, corruption, and
judicial incompetence. The legal process seemed too often to
be a weapon used by the dominant forces in society against the
poor and the minorities, who needed protection the most.
20 7
Insofar as there was any deliberate concern forjudicial discour-
tesy, it arose from a perceived need to portray the courts as a bu-
reaucracy that could serve as a neutral arbiter in the cultural war.2 08
The problem with Judge Hoffman's response in the trial of the Chi-
cago Seven was not his behavior in itself, but rather his apparent
bias against the defendants.20 9
However, the courtesy rules created the danger of deterring
alternate judicial styles and encouraging a bureaucratic style of
judging. In this way, the courtesy rules undermined the new under-
standing of personal (as distinct from institutional) independence
in which judges would be free to draw on their personality and
emotions to craft the proper solution, which was championed by a
few notable observers at the time.
IV.
REGULATING JUDICIAL COURTESY
Beginning in the 1970s, states established commissions to regu-
late judges and adopted the new Code of Judicial Conduct as the
205. See id.
206. Braithwaite, supra note 159, at 152.
207. Jeremy Main, Only Radical Reform Can Save the Courts, FORTUNE, Aug.
1970, at 112.
208. Id.
209. SeeJON WIENER, CONSPIRACY IN THE STREETS: THE EXTRAORDINARY TiAI.
OF THE CHICAGO EIGHT 27 (2006).
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governing standards. With the expansion ofjudicial self-regulation,
the ABA's judicial ethics code became more than a statement of
professional aspiration. State courts' interpretations of the courtesy
rules along with commissions' enforcement of the rules offer fur-
ther insight into evolving views of judicial independence. The en-
forcement of norms governing judges' courtroom demeanor marks
a sea change from the early days when judges' personal indepen-
dence to administer judicial proceedings as they saw fit was taken
for granted and concerns about protecting judicial independence
centered on judges' decision-making role and on judicial
outcomes.
Judges have expressed concern that an overly broad interpreta-
tion along with excessive enforcement of the courtesy rules may en-
croach on individual judges' independence from the judiciary as an
institution by chilling their ability to address legitimate ends
through individual styles and through the expression of individual
personality.210 Nonetheless, courts have allowed regulatory authori-
ties to punish judges if they appear to overstep the bounds of cour-
tesy even while serving legitimate ends.21 1 Thus, the judiciary as an
institution has bartered the independence of individual judges in
order to preserve its branch independence, using a robust idea of
courtesy to perpetuate the myth that individual personality and
emotion play no role in the judicial function. Strict enforcement of
courtesy rules, largely for the sake of appearance, unduly interferes
with judges' latitude to administer judicial proceedings, and more
cautious enforcement should be employed to preserve the ability of
judges to draw on individual personality, intuition, and emotions,
and generally to adopt an activist or experimental approach to the
conduct of the courtroom.
A. Regulatory Background of the Courtesy Rules
The establishment of judicial conduct commissions in the
1970s shifted the focus of judicial regulation generally,2 12 and of
the regulation of discourtesy in particular. Until then, courts had
210. See infra Part IV.B.1.
211. See infra Part IV.B.2.
212. According to a bar association report tracing the history ofjudicial disci-
pline in New York, in the first twenty years after the state adopted a Commission
on Judicial Conduct, the Commission removed 110judges and publicly disciplined
more than 400 others, whereas the state legislature had not removed a judge in
more than 120 years. Task Force on Judicial Selection & Court Merger, Ass'n of
the Bar of the City of N.Y., Judicial Accountability andJudicial Independence, 51 REc.
629, 630 (1996).
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limited occasion to reflect on questions of judicial personality in
their opinions. The judicial Canons were originally aspirational,
not enforceable, and therefore were rarely the subject of judicial
decisions. Only extreme cases of judicial misconduct subjected
judges to legislative impeachment, criminal indictment, or other
extreme sanctions that might be available. Impatience and discour-
tesy in running a courtroom obviously would not qualify,2 1 but at
best were regulated informally through the influence of friends and
colleagues or public criticism in the media.
2 14
Before the advent of judicial conduct commissions, appellate
courts reviewing trial court proceedings did have occasions to de-
termine whether ajudge's bullying or harassing conduct deprived a
party of a fair trial or necessitated the judge's recusal.2 15 But in this
context, the question before courts was not whether the judge en-
gaged in misconduct calling for some measure of moral oppro-
brium, much less whether the judge's conduct suggested that he
was temperamentally unsuited to continue to serve. Judicial excess
necessitating an appellate remedy could just as easily be character-
ized as trial error or misjudgment as it could misconduct, and
courts generally had no need to draw the distinction. The focus
was on appellate review as a mechanism for regulating proceedings,
not for regulating lower court judges per se, and therefore an opin-
ion critical of a judge was not necessarily the functional equivalent
of a reprimand.
Consequently, high-minded judicial rhetoric about judges' de-
meanor had little practical significance; the aspirational statements
standing alone did not compromise individual judges' indepen-
dence. Judicial impatience was the stuff of lore, not law, and the
trial lawyer's expected response was not to file a grievance but to
213. See generally Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and
the Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 673, 682-96
(1999) (analyzing scope of congressional authority to impeach federal judges).
214. See generafly Sambhav N. Sankar, Comment, Disciplining the Professional
Judge, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1254-55 (2000) (describing informal discipline of
judges).
215. Compare, e.g., W. Coal & Mining Co. v. Kranc, 100 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Ark.
1937) (cautioning against impatient remarks and comments that might prejudice
a party or improperly sway the jury), and Pickerell v. Griffith, 29 N.W.2d 588, 595,
597 (Iowa 1947) (reversing judgment in part because trial judge improperly re-
buked counsel), with Loreno v. Ross, 133 So. 251, 253 (Ala. 1931) (finding that
trial court properly instructed counsel to "keep quiet" to protect opposing party's
right of cross-examination), and Ryan v. Crookston, 30 N.W.2d 351, 352 (Minn.
1947) (holding that most of trial judge's challenged remarks were justified to en-
sure an orderly process).
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Annual Survey of American Law
538 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 64:497
grow a thicker skin. 216 Evolving and competing theories ofjudging
underlying discussions of courtesy remained, but were not imple-
mented or tested, because the injunction against judicial discour-
tesy had no legal bite.
The establishment of judicial conduct commissions changed
that by requiring courts to determine when procedural error consti-
tuted misconduct.217 The unenforceable judicial ideal that judges
should be patient, dignified and courteous became an enforceable
standard of conduct.2 18 Any judge who responded impatiently or
discourteously to parties or their lawyers could be potentially sanc-
tioned by suspension or removal from the bench or by a lesser pun-
ishment such as public censure that would affect the judge's
reputation and ability to win reappointment or reelection.2 1 9
Given the breadth of the judicial standard-cum-rule, the ABA
or state courts might have been expected to narrow it when the
judicial Canons were revised. However, state judiciaries almost en-
tirely relied on the ABA models, and, as noted, the ABA drafters
gave no serious thought to the courtesy rules.
22 0
216. See, e.g., McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Counsel Conduct and Disa-
bility Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S, 264 F.3d 52, 84 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that "reasonably resilient and thick-skinned
lawyers [may have the ability] to present their cases effectively" despite a judge's
harsh management style).
217. Some courts attempted to draw a line between mere judicial error, which
does not subject a judge to discipline, and legal error which "clearly and convinc-
ingly reflects bad faith .... bias..., abuse of authority. .. , disregard for fundamen-
tal rights .... intentional disregard of the law.... or any purpose other than the
faithful discharge of judicial duty." Oberholzer v. Comm'n on Judicial Perform-
ance, 975 P.2d 663, 680 (Cal. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Gerald Stem, Judi-
cial Error That Is Subject to Discipline in New York, 32 HoFsTiRA L. REv. 1547, 1562
(2004) (asserting that "[d]iscipliningjudges for errors of law is controversial," but
nevertheless advocating sanctions for "flagrant" or "egregious" legal error).
218. See, e.g., Gregory C. O'Brien, Jr., Speech May Be Free and Talk Cheap, but
Judges Can Pay a Heavy Price for Unguarded Expression, 28 Loy. LA. L. REv. 815,
821-23 (1995) (describing cases where judges were sanctioned for abusive
conduct).
219. The judge is potentially subject to discipline in the lawyer disciplinary
process as well.
220. The most recent round of revisions to the judicial canons involved disa-
greement about whether to delete the requirement that judges avoid the "appear-
ance of impropriety." See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, judicial Ethics, the Appearance of
Impropriety, and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HoFsrRA L. REv. 1337, 1340
(2006) (criticizing the "appearance of impropriety" standard as unduly vague).
But no attention was paid to the courtesy rule, which was slightly expanded. As
newly amended and renumbered, the courtesy rule, Rule 2.8(b) of the Model Code
ofJudicial Conduct, provides: "A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to
litigants,jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom
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The question then became how to interpret and enforce the
rules. Few would quarrel with applying the rules to certain judicial
conduct, such as when judges' unprovoked and purely gratuitous
rudeness creates a judicial atmosphere in which participants are in-
timidated from making the full presentation necessary to a fair de-
cision, or when discourtesy is symptomatic of impermissible bias.
But it would be unrealistic to expect every judge who displays dis-
courtesy to be disciplined under the courtesy rule, notwithstanding
its broad and unqualified language.2 21 Even judges with the most
impressive self-control are prone to impatience in response to the
pressures of a demanding docket, an obstreperous lawyer, or cir-
cumstances outside court, and some can be short-tempered but still
be regarded as fair and impartial.2 22 The question for judicial com-
missions is whether self-expression that crosses the line should be
regarded as morally blameworthy conduct worthy of punishment,
rather than as judicial error like other procedural error.
Whether discourteous acts and statements will be branded as
judicial misconduct, labeled as merely an error or misjudgment, or
regarded as a legitimate if debatable expression of the judicial role
reflects how judicial institutions regard particular conceptions ofju-
dicial independence. On the one hand, aggressive applications of
the rule and literal judicial interpretations preserving the possibility
that the rule may be invoked for any expression of impatience,
breach of dignity, or discourtesy promote the image of judicial de-
tachment in order to preserve branch independence, but do so at
the risk of chilling legitimate behavior. Limitations on the use of
the rule, in turn, privilege individual independence by giving freer
play to judicial management styles and judicial philosophies that
involve bringing one's full personality to the task ofjudging, but do
so at risk to public respect for the legitimacy of the judiciary as an
the judge deals in an official capacity...." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr R.
2.8(b) (2007). The earlier provision, Canon 3B(4), which is the basis of most cur-
rent state judicial codes, made no express reference to court staff and officials.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) (1990).
221. See Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on 'Temper in the Court: A Forum on
Judicial Civility," 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 712, 716-17 (1996) (maintaining that
judges' "blatant rudeness, nastiness, and arrogance ... are well known to people
who are frequently in the [New York] courts," and identifying alternative ways of
seeking to remedy it).
222. See, e.g.,Jan Hoffman, The Transformation of aJudge; A 35-yearJourney Starts
on Left and Goes Right, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 4, 1996, § 1, at 35 (discussing trial court
judge, Harold Rothwax, known as the Prince of Darkness in part for his harsh
courtroom demeanor, and quoting Manhattan district attorney: "He's a tough
judge and a no-nonsense guy, but that doesn't make him pro-prosecutorial. He
calls the issues as he sees them.").
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institution. Some judicial discussions of courtesy recognize this ten-
sion, but others fail to take it into account.
223
B. Interpreting the Courtesy Rules
In the context of interpreting and applying the rules governing
judicial courtesy, authorities have considered the relationship be-
tween expectations of judicial courtesy and conceptions of judicial
independence. Conceptions ofjudicial independence, and particu-
larly of individual judges' independence from judicial institutions,
implicitly underlie all discussions about the expectations of cour-
tesy. In some cases, these considerations have been brought ex-
pressly to the surface. A minority ofjudges have urged interpreting
courtesy rules narrowly, reflecting respect for the values of personal
independence and individual judicial style. Others, however, have
endorsed broad interpretations that reinforce the image of imper-
sonal judging, thereby privileging institutional independence over
the independence of individual judges.
1. Interpretations recognizing the relevance of judicial personality
Given the considerations of judicial independence underlying
approaches to judicial courtesy, one might expect courts to read
the rules conservatively to incorporate implicit limitations. A few
courts and judges have done so by limiting the rules' reach to
judges' expressions of impatience or discourtesy that are, in some
respect, particularly extreme or harmful. This approach is exempli-
fied by In re Hocking where the Michigan Supreme Court stated that
"every angry retort or act of discourtesy during the course of a pro-
ceeding does not amount to judicial misconduct.... [A] judge is
only subject to discipline when the comment amounts to 'conduct
that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice."' 22 4 Au-
thorities have offered various formulations for narrowing the cir-
cumstances in which discourtesy subjects ajudge to sanction. Some
focus on the flagrancy or obviousness of the misconduct 22 5 or its
harmfulness.22 6 Some decisions, while not explicitly limiting the
courtesy rules' reach, justify the imposition of sanctions by under-
223. See infra Part IV.B.
224. 546 N.W.2d 234, 241-42 (Mich. 1996) (citing MICH. CT. R. 9.205(E)).
225. See McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Counsel Conduct and Disability
Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(Tatel, J., dissenting).
226. See Hocking, 546 N.W.2d at 241-42.
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scoring the extent to which discourtesy expresses bias or under-
mines the fairness of the process.
2 27
Limiting interpretations of judicial standards regulating
judges' intemperance might reflect any of several considerations.
Chief among these would be a rejection of the idea that judges
must project a sober and emotionally detached demeanor in order
to convince the public of their impartiality. The leading opinion
making allowances for judges' emotions and ordinary human limi-
tations is that of Justice Scalia for the Court in Liteky v. United
States. 22 8 The opinion underscored the need for the law to account
for human frailties that do not undermine judges' ability to make
decisions fairly and to afford a fair process:
U] udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical
or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or
their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality chal-
lenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives
from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal
such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair
judgment impossible.... Not establishing bias or partiality, how-
ever, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and
even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and
women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes
display. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration---even
a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom admin-
istration-remain immune.
22 9
227. See, e.g., Dodds v. Comm'n on judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1270
(Cal. 1995) (emphasizing that the judge's rudeness had the effect of denying a
party a fair hearing); Sardino v. State Comm'n on judicial Conduct, 448 N.E,2d 83,
85 (N.Y. 1983) (explaining that the judge's "statements could only create the im-
pression in the mind of the public that he was predisposed against those defend-
ants who appeared before him if not defendants generally").
228. 510 U.S. 540 (1994). The issue was whether a federal district judge had
wrongly failed to recuse himself in a criminal case for bias based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a), which requires a federal judge to "disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The Court rejected the
allegation that "the judge had displayed 'impatience, disregard for the defense and
animosity' toward" the defendant, especially by "interrupt[ing] the closing argu-
ment of' a co-defendant and "instructing him to cease the introduction of new
facts, and to restrict himself to discussion of evidence already presented." Id. at
542-43, 556. The Court's philosophical approach to judicial courtesy would be no
less applicable, however, in the context of deciding whether to discipline a judge
for misconduct.
229. Id. at 555-56 (emphasis added); see also id, at 550-51 ("The judge who
presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill dis-
posed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensi-
ble person.").
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Such an approach to courtesy rules would also accommodate
the reality of judicial settings. Conduct that might fairly be charac-
terized as discourteous in the abstract can be reasonable in the con-
text of proceedings in which a judge is provoked or is otherwise
seeking to maintain order.2 30 Further, a judge's occasional rude-
ness or discourtesy may be a reaction to the generally stressful con-
ditions in which some judges operate.2 3 1 Decisions interpreting the
courtesy rules narrowly in light of the reality of judges' humanity
are not necessarily meant to encourage judges to bring their emo-
tions to their work.2 3 2 But such decisions recognize that the judge's
personality, including expressions of temper or impatience, is an
important asset in managing the courtroom. Thus, the majority in
Hocking cautioned that "[t]o hold that a trial judge may not express
strong displeasure or even anger, would ignore the reality that the
potential for such reactions induces a level of civility in the process,
without which the system literally could not function."
2 33
230. See, e.g., Hocking, 546 N.W.2d at 241. After having previously argued at
length in favor of a significant sentence, the prosecutor interrupted the judge as
he was announcing and justifying a lesser sentence, leading the judge to lose his
temper and respond acrimoniously. See id. The judge directed the prosecutor not
to interrupt him and to sit down, stating that he was going to fashion the sentence
and make comments whether she liked it or not, and challenging her to appeal if
she did not like what he said. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the state
commission's finding that the judge was "impermissibly rude" in dealing with the
prosecutor in a sentencing hearing. See id. at 236-38. It found the sentencing
judge's response to the prosecutor's provocation to be "overly strong" but "also
understandable" in light of the prosecutor's breach of courtroom etiquette. Id. at
242.
231. For example, although the Hocking court sustained a different charge
arising out of a custody proceeding in which the judge responded harshly to a
lawyer's repeated interruptions, a dissenting judge disagreed, maintaining:
Ideally, a judge should not instigate or engage in confrontational behavior or
react to such behavior-no matter how provoked. Yet, every attorney who
regularly appears before the judges of our state, judges who are forced to
operate with limited resources and under great pressure from the docket, will
immediately recognize that outbursts like Judge Hocking's are far from infre-
quent. Most judges wrestle with their self-control, and all hear motions they
are predisposed against and antagonistic toward. I join the majority in wish-
ing we could populate our courtrooms with judges devoid of temper and full
of angelic patience. But if such perfect creatures exist, their planetary origin
is truly unknown.
Id. at 247 (Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232. For example, the dissenting judge in Hocking held that "we do the judici-
ary a disservice when we condemn human failings as judicial misconduct," but ad-
hered to the ideal that "U]udges should struggle to maintain their temperament
and view the cases before them unobscured by passion." Id. at 247.
233. Id. at 245 (majority opinion).
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Limiting interpretations might reflect at least two additional
premises. The first is the need, particularly given the limitations
and complexities of extemporaneous verbal expression, to permit
individual judges freedom of expression. For example, the Second
Circuit's judicial council recently did so in rejecting allegations that
a districtjudge, among other things, engaged in abusive speech.
23 4
The court emphasized "that in the heat and tension of court pro-
ceedings, ambiguities can easily occur."2s5 Further, it expressed no
doubt about the propriety of the judge's passion-in this case, the
trial judge's "growing exasperation" 2 6-that made clear, measured
judicial expression especially difficult.
Second, limiting interpretations may reflect respect for individ-
ual judging styles and philosophies. This was expressed most ex-
plicitly by Circuit Judge Tatel in a dissenting opinion arising out of
the discipline of District Judge John McBryde.237 Judge Tatel main-
234. See In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 465 F.3d 532, 541-47 (2d Cir.
2006). Federal courts do not enforce the judicial canons but may sanction a fed-
eral judge for engaging "in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts." 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (2000). In
this case, the disciplinary charge arose out of a capital case in which the defense
lawyer, following his client's instructions, refused to challenge the defendant's im-
pending execution. See Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 465 F.3d at 542-43. The
judge strongly took issue with the lawyer's conduct in light of doubts raised by
other witnesses about the defendant's competence, and the judge warned the law-
yer that he risked discipline-threatening, "I'll have your law license"-if it turned
out, contrary to the lawyer's belief, that the defendant was incompetent. Id. at 544.
Although the trial judge, in hindsight, acknowledged that he spoke too vehe-
mently "under the stress of the circumstances," id. at 545, and apologized for his
choice of words, id. at 546, the circuit's judicial council, adopting the report and
recommendations of a three-judge special committee, agreed that he had not en-
gaged in misconduct. Id. at 547. The report recognized that the judge's remark
was ambiguous-it could be understood either as an improper threat to misuse his
influence to cause the lawyer's license to be revoked or as a permissible threat to
refer the lawyer to the disciplinary authorities for an independent determination.
Id. at 546.
235. Charges ofjudicial Misconduct, 465 F.3d at 547; see also In re Lichtenstein,
685 P.2d 204, 209 (Colo. 1984) (rejecting judicial commission's recommendation
to sanction sentencing judge and observing that "[a] lthough the sentencing com-
ments contain some phraseology which, read in isolation, might have offended the
sensibilities of others .... the choice of words was no more than an awkwardly
executed effort" to describe facts justifying the sentence); Hocking, 546 N.W.2d at
240 (observing that "every graceless, distasteful, or bungled attempt to communi-
cate the reason for a judge's decision cannot serve as the basis for judicial
discipline").
236. Charges ofJudicial Misconduct, 465 F.3d at 546.
237. McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Counsel Conduct and Disability
Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S, 264 F.3d 52, 76-80 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Judge McBryde was suspended from the bench and reprimanded for a pattern of
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tained "that the principle of judicial independence permits sanc-
dons to be imposed only for conduct that is clearly abusive or clearly
prejudicial to the adversarial process,"2 8 reasoning that to "'pro-
mote[ ] judicial individualism,'" judicial independence requires
some "protection against... interference by fellow judges" as well
as from other government branches, particularly in the " ' decisional
function."' 2 3 9 This requires "not only judges' freedom to reach
their own conclusions about questions of fact and law, but also a
margin of discretion to manage and control the adversarial process
within their courtrooms."2 40 While acknowledging that federal ju-
dicial councils should have power to sanction judges who abuse
their trial management authority, he identified several reasons why
this power should be used only where judicial conduct was clearly
abusive or clearly prejudicial. These reasons include the fact that
there are many "appropriate courtroom management techniques";
that appellate judges on judicial councils may lack experience deal-
ing with overly aggressive lawyers and may therefore punish legiti-
mate courtroom management; that unfair or even vindictive
colleagues may use judicial discipline "to sanction unpopular
judges engaged in appropriate behavior"; and that 'Judicial disci-
pline, like civil liability for judicial acts, can chill the proper exer-
cise of judicial discretion."
24 1
2. Interpretations subordinating judicial personality and privileging
branch independence
For the most part, courts and disciplinary bodies purport to
take the courtesy rules literally, meaning that a single act of impa-
abusive behavior toward parties, lawyers, and fellow judges, and later challenged
the sanction on constitutional and other grounds. A majority of the D.C. Circuit
panel rejected the challenge, principally forjurisdictional reasons, butJudge Tatel
dissented and, in the process, addressed the merits of Judge McBryde's claims,
including his claim that theJudicial Council "unconstitutionally interfered with his
judicial independence by punishing him because it disagrees with his judicial phi-
losophy and acts." Id. at 76 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 77 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
239. Id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 59 n.10 (1982), and Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the
U.S. (Chandler 1), 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970)).
240. Id. at 78.
241. Id. at 80; see also In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99, 100 (Cal. 1982) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); In re Ross, 428 A.2d 858, 866 (Me. 1981). Judge Tatel agreed that even
under this standard, some ofJudge McBryde's conduct was "so extreme and clearly
abusive" as to warrant discipline, but found that most of the conduct on which
Judge McBryde's sanctions were premised was either clearly or potentially appro-
priate. McBiyde, 264 F.3d at 81-85 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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tience will subject a judge to punishment, limited only by the en-
forcement authorities' discretion whether to initiate proceedings.
Against the background of the opinions of Justice Scalia, Judge
Tatel, and others implicitly raising concerns that taking expecta-
tions of courtesy too literally will encroach on judicial indepen-
dence, these opinions can be understood as an adoption of the
bureaucratic conception of judicial independence and a rejection
of the modem individualistic conception.
This predominant literalism is exemplified by the New York
State Judicial Conduct Commission's pronouncement that "[e]ven
a single instance of intemperate language may be the basis for a
finding of misconduct."2 42 Even when opinions contain some po-
tentially qualifying language or references to the harms caused by
incivility, most make no serious effort at line-drawing, viewing dis-
courtesy as a sufficient evil in itself to be regarded as misconduct.
In some cases, courts expressly reject considerations identified by
those who advocate narrower application of courtesy rules.2 43 In
other cases, they do so implicitly.244 For the most part, however,
courts and judicial commissions make no reference to considera-
tions that counsel against taking courtesy rules literally and, in par-
ticular, avoid discussing the concern that regulating judicial
courtesy raises profound questions about the judicial role and
function.
2 45
242. In re Hannigan, N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 1997 WL
809945 (Dec. 17, 1997) (sanctioning a judge who called an accused "garbage" and
"trash," derogated her defense, and attempted to badger her to plead guilty). The
opinion cited, by way of illustration, an earlier disciplinary opinion, In re Going,
N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 1997 WL 433228 (July 18, 1997), which is
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 254-63.
243. See, e.g., In re Brown, 691 N.E.2d 573, 577 (Mass. 1998) (expressly re-
jecting the relevance ofJustice Scalia's observations in Liteky and concluding that
bias and prejudice are unnecessary to a finding that "[i]mpatience, a lack of dig-
nity, or discourtesy" constitutes sanctionable misconduct).
244. For example, in contrast to opinions recognizing the legitimacy of
judges' personality and of their diverse judicial philosophies, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court opinions have emphasized the need " ' to subordinate one's personal
pulls and one's private views.'" In re Mathesius, 910 A.2d 594, 614-15 (NJ. 2006)
(quoting Dunlap v. Friedman's, Inc., 582 S.E.2d 841, 850 n.4 (W. Va. 2003) (Davis,
J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotations omitted)). Likewise, that court
has emphasized the importance of preserving "the independence of the judiciary"
as an institution (as distinct from the independence of individual judges) by disci-
plining judges whose conduct undermines public confidence in, and respect for,
the judiciary. Id. at 608 (quoting In re Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 121 (N.J. 1993)).
245. See, e.g., Hon. Charles D. Breitel, Ethical Problems in the Performance of the
Judicial Function, in CONFERENCE ON JUDIcAL Emicis 64, 64-65 (U. Chi. Confer-
ence Series Oct. 22, 1964) (concluding that "the problems ofjudicial ethics in the
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Courts taking the rules literally have found certain judicial ex-
pressions to be sanctionable even when they do not implicate the
fairness of the proceeding. For example, in In re Bennett, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court suspended a probate judge, in part, for his "use
of off-color language... in an entirely injudicious manner,"246 con-
sisting of two uses each of the words "hell" and "ass."2 47 The court
expressed no concern that the offensive language somehow under-
mined the fairness of the proceedings. The court primarily re-
garded the judge's coarse language as inappropriate in judicial
proceedings because it tarnishes the image of the judge and the
judiciary.2 4 8 Similarly, the Third Circuit's decision in Krasnov v.
Dinan, which upheld a district court'sjudgment on a jurisdictional
issue, noted in passing that the district judge had violated the cour-
tesy rule when, evidently impatient with the plaintiff's lawyer's pro-
cedural objections, he told the lawyer: "You can dissent until you
drop dead. I'm sick and tired of hearing it."249 The appellate court
found that nothing in the lawyer's advocacy in this case justified the
trial judge's "injudicious remarks."
250
actual performance of the judicial function are, with rare exceptions, aspects of
one's personal philosophy and one's general legal philosophy" and observing that
"the most important decision that the judge makes for himself is whether he will
play an affirmative or quiescent role in the performance of his function").
246. 267 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Mich. 1978).
247. Id. The statements were: "[Y]ou were bombed on your ass," "[T]he de-
fendant had a bad case of death resulting from numerous shotgun bullets up his
ass," "I don't know what in hell they'll do with you," and "[T] here's about as much
chance as a snowball in hell of us ever getting any money out of you." Id. The
court observed that the judge's language "can only have been expected to offend,
berate or intimidate the persons to whom it was addressed," id., and that, together
with abusive off-the-bench statements, it "demonstrates a gross lack ofjudicial tem-
perament," "is clearly prejudicial to the administration ofjustice," and "necessarily
demeaned the office he holds." Id. at 919-20.
248. The court recognized that a judge may speak more colorfully "in the
privacy of his or her office or among close acquaintances," id. at 918, but man-
dated a more austere style on the bench, presumably to project an appearance that
is contrary to the judge's real-life, off-the-bench self.
249. 465 F.2d 1298, 1303 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972). The court, however, rejected the
plaintiff's claim that the judge's conduct was so hostile as to amount to a denial of
due process. Id.
250. Id. The court acknowledged that "[t]rial tactics of energetic counsel
may, at times, make it extremely difficult for a court to maintain a calm and dispas-
sionate demeanor," but did not find that to be so here. Id. Its objection was not
that the district judge failed to entertain the lawyer's arguments and, thus, de-
prived his client of a fair process. On the contrary, the appellate court might have
considered it to be good courtroom management if, delivering the same message,
the trial judge had said, "You are making the same points repeatedly; I have al-
ready ruled; you are free to raise your procedural objections on appeal, but you are
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C. Enforcing the Courtesy Rules
When courtesy rules are read literally by the courts, their reach
might nevertheless be narrowed in practice by judicial conduct
commissions, which have discretion whether to bring charges, and
by courts, which have discretion whether to impose punishment.
Certainly, the code drafters and some courts expect such discretion
generally to be employed in judicial regulation. Recognizing that
some of the rules, as written, cannot realistically serve as inviolable
disciplinary standards, the judicial codes' drafters have relied on
the enforcement authorities' discretion to temper the rules' ex-
cesses. Although the 1990 Code's preamble states that its provi-
sions are "intended to govern conduct of judges and be binding on
them,"251 it also acknowledges that "[i]t is not intended ... that
every transgression will result in disciplinary action."2 52 Likewise,
some courts that take the courtesy rules literally acknowledge a pol-
icy of imposing discipline only in serious cases, such as those involv-
ing moral turpitude or a pattern of abuse.
253
The state courts' reliance on state judicial commissions to exer-
cise discretion to temper the overbreadth of the courtesy rules puts
tremendous power in the commissions' hands. This is, at least im-
plicitly, a powerful rejection of the idea ofjudicial independence in
all of the senses in which Judge Tatel understood it-including the
personal independence of judges to employ different philosophies
and styles in managing their courtrooms; the independence of
judges from the influence of their colleagues; and the indepen-
dence ofjudges from non-judicial bodies. Indeed, the concerns ex-
pressed by Judge Tatel regarding encroachments on federal judges'
independence are magnified in the state system.
The problem may be illustrated by In re Going,254 in which a
family court judge explained to a pro se petitioner seeking visita-
using valuable district-court time for no good end by repeating them here." But
from the appellate court's perspective, the trial judge's actual mode of expression,
which made the point in a somewhat more informal, colorful and emphatic man-
ner, had no place in the courtroom.
251. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT preamble 1 5 (1990).
252. Id. The Preamble continues: "Whether disciplinary action is appropri-
ate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed, should be determined through a
reasonable and reasoned application of the text and should depend on such fac-
tors as the seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper
activity and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial system."
Id.
253. See, e.g., In re Mathesius, 910 A.2d 594, 613-14 (NJ. 2006).
254. In re Going, N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 1997 WL 433228
(July 18, 1997).
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tion rights that he was requiring the petitioner to submit to a psy-
chological evaluation "because it appears to me ... that you are
more than a little nuts."2 55 The New York state judicial commission
instituted proceedings against the judge and ultimately entered
into an agreement that the judge would be publicly admonished
based on an agreed-upon recitation of the relevant facts. The com-
mission justified this on the ground that the judge's "disparage-
ment of a litigant from the bench" was a breach "of judicial
temperament" that impaired "'the public's image of the dignity
and impartiality of courts."'
256
Significantly, the judiciary had no hand in the proceedings
against Going and never reviewed them to determine whether the
commission's theory of misconduct accorded with its own under-
standing of how the courtesy rules should be applied.257 The opin-
ion justifying the sanction in Going, reciting a set of bare-bone
stipulated facts, essentially lifted the family court judge's statements
out of context, making it unclear to readers why (if at all) the re-
marks were sanctionable. Presumably, the commission's theory was
that the word "nuts" is so gratuitously disparaging that it was highly
improper for the judge to use it to describe the petitioner's affect
or conduct. The commission's underlying theory of good judging
is highly contestable, however. Family courts, a species of problem-
solving courts, scarcely resemble the federal appellate courts with
which the drafters of the original courtesy rules were most famil-
255. Id. The state commission recently relied on Going as authority in In re
Pines, in which a family court judge was sanctioned for purportedly uncivil state-
ments off the bench and in two court proceedings. In re Pines, N.Y. State Comm'n
on Judicial Conduct, 2008 WL 4415139 (June, 17 2008). In one proceeding, the
judge referred to a prisoner's request for joint custody as "patently ridiculous" and
an "absolute waste of... time," and referred to the prisoner's testimony as "inane"
and as the most "ridiculous testimony [he had heard] in twelve years on the
bench." Id. at *2. In the other, the judge told incarcerated parents seeking cus-
tody of their three children, "As far as I'm concerned, you're not in a position to
take care of pets, much less children." Id. at *3.
256. Going, 1997 WL 433228.
257. Thus, this was not an instance as in McBryde of a proceeding instigated
and overseen byjudges. Disciplinary proceedings in Going were instigated by, and
punishment was negotiated by, lawyer-staff members who serve full-time in a
prosecutorial role. These staff members answered, in turn, not to a court or group
of judges directly, but to an appointed commission. Although the disciplinary
agency is nominally under the judicial branch, rather than the other government
branches, it is hard to see how that makes much practical difference from the
perspective of preserving individual judges' independence from third parties. See
generaUy Sankar, supra note 214, at 1256-69 (distinguishing federal judicial com-
missions, which exercise collegial controls, with the California Commission on Ju-
dicial Performance, which exercises bureaucratic controls).
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iar.258 Based on his observations, the family court judge in Going
might have considered it to be in the best interest of the petitioner
and his child for the petitioner to obtain a psychological evaluation
and, ultimately, appropriate psychological counseling or treat-
ment.2 5 9 What the commission regarded as disparaging may have
been, in the judge's view and perhaps in fact, the more effective
manner of communicating with this particular party. For a commis-
sion and its staff to employ the disciplinary mechanism to take sides
in a legitimate debate over the judicial role encroaches on the inde-
pendence not only of the particular judge who is sanctioned but
also of otherjudges who refrain from experimentation to avoid sim-
ilar results.2 60 Arguably, the debate should be resolved through in-
formal, non-punitive processes261 or through the reappointment or
reelection process. Although a reviewing court might have con-
cluded that the family court judge's approach in Going was legiti-
mate-or, at worst, mistaken-as a practical matter the judge
probably did not have an opportunity to offer this defense to the
court.26 2
258. Of course, even in appellate courts, incivility is scarcely unknown, al-
though easier to cloak from public view. For a discussion of incivility in the inter-
personal relationships and dissenting opinions of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices, see
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative ofJudical
Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 583, 626-44 (1994).
259. Family court judges have a high volume of cases in many of which they
communicate directly with unrepresented parties. Judges legitimately perceive
that their responsibility is not simply to rule on applications, but to influence par-
ties proactively to do what is best for children and families, which often involves
helping or prompting them to gain access to counseling and social services.
Judges draw inferences about parties' needs based on direct interaction with them
in the courtroom.
260. Besides chilling innovative judicial styles, the risk of discipline for judi-
cial incivility may bias judges in favor of institutional parties, and especially those
with political clout. For example, prosecutors and other government lawyers who
appear in court regularly can keep track ofjudges' on-the-bench conduct and com-
plain of those who issue unfavorable rulings that, in themselves, would not subject
ajudge to sanction. See, e.g., Oberholzer v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 975
P.2d 663, 683 (Cal. 1999) (dismissing disciplinary charge, originating with a com-
plaint presumably filed by the prosecutor, that the trial judge acted uncivilly in
dismissing a criminal charge); In re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872, 888 (N.Y. 1998)
(removing judge whose investigation was prompted by his release of a misde-
meanor defendant who subsequently committed homicide, and facilitated by two
prosecutors' offices which provided transcripts documenting alleged abuses).
261. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example,
52 S.C. L. REv. 667, 690-92 (2001) (advocating performance evaluations to pro-
mote judicial professionalism).
262. NewYorkjudges (and, perhaps, most judges) are notoriously underpaid,
while New York legal fees are notoriously high; for a judge who subsists on his
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Although judicial conduct commissions might ordinarily pro-
ceed in only the most compelling cases, there is no reason to take
that for granted. Judicial commissions have various incentives to
proceed selectively against judges for borderline conduct, as in the
Going case, while overlooking more abusive conduct. Doing so es-
tablishes the commission's view of where the lines are drawn and
deters judges from crossing it, while suggesting to the public that
the commission is vigilant and not overly protective of the judiciary.
Further, the civility rules can be invoked against judges who are
controversial or disliked for reasons unrelated to sanctionable mis-
conduct. Whether state commissions in fact target judges under
the civility rules for unrelated reasons cannot be determined.
263
It is difficult to reconcile a complex concept of judicial inde-
pendence with state courts' delegation of broad discretion to judi-
cial commissions to selectively prosecute cases of discourtesy. State
courts that eschew conservative readings of the courtesy rules and
place their faith in commissions comprised of lawyers and laymen,
not exclusively judges, presumably regard neither the indepen-
dence of individual judges nor that of judges collectively as para-
mount. The independence of the judicial branch, including
administrators, law clerks, bailiffs, deputies, and judicial commis-
sions, is paramount. In this view, judicial commissions are not a
threat to judicial independence, even though judges may have little
salary, an effective defense would be prohibitively expensive. Thus, judicial com-
missions have not only enormous discretion, but also enormous leverage to en-
force their own judicial philosophies through selective employment of the courtesy
rules. An additional disincentive to seeking judicial review is that, at least in New
York, the reviewing court is highly deferential to the judicial conduct commission.
From 1978 to August 14, 2007, the Court of Appeals had dismissed the charges in
only one of the eighty-five cases in which it reviewed determinations of the state
Commission on Judicial Conduct (although the Court of Appeals did reduce the
sanction in a number of cases). News Release, New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Press%20Releases/
julyto.sept__2007.htm.
263. The judicial disciplinary process is not particularly transparent. The
cases in which judicial commissions decline to proceed are not public. Judicial
commissions do not publish, and probably do not develop, principles or guidelines
to govern their exercise of discretion in bringing incivility charges. Further, pub-
lished decisions are only the tip of the iceberg, since disciplinary prosecutions may
end in private sanctions or none at all. For example, the judicial commission in
California issues "advisory letters" when it believes that judicial misconduct does
not warrant a public sanction. A 1999 California Supreme Court opinion noted
that in the previous nine years, the state judicial commission had issued an average
of thirty-seven advisory letters a year, of which the largest category involved the
rule requiringjudges to be "patient, dignified and courteous." Oberho/,er, 975 P.2d
at 671-72 n.8.
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influence over them, because the commissions are part of ajudicial
bureaucracy into which judges, individually and collectively, are
subsumed. The selective enforcement of courtesy rules leads
judges to accept their role in the collective enterprise alongside the
full panoply of judicial personnel and to privilege the indepen-
dence of the judiciary as an occasionally threatened branch of gov-
ernment over that of judges themselves.
D. Courtesy and the Veneer of Neutrality
In a characteristically prophetic moment in 1897, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr. wrote, " [T] he logical method and form flatter the
longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind.
But certainty generally is an illusion, and repose is not the destiny
of man."264 Maybe not. However, at times of unrest particularly,
popular opinion seeks that certainty. It gravitates not only toward
the logical method but also toward a particular image of the judicial
process and the judge that satisfies that same longing. This is par-
ticularly so when the courts have been asked to serve as final arbi-
ters of controversial and socially divisive questions.
At his confirmation hearings, John Roberts emphasized quali-
ties of "modesty" and "humility" in a judge and famously suggested
that judges "call balls and strikes"; they do not hit or pitch.265 He
further elaborated on the view of judges as umpires, interpreting
but not making law, in an interview with Jeffrey Rosen published in
the Atlantic Monthly.266 Roberts suggested that there should be
fewer colorful personalities on the bench and more considered rea-
soning; fewer dissents and more unanimous opinions.267 The prob-
lem, as Roberts described it, was "the personalization of judicial
politics."268 Roberts explained, "What you're trying to establish-
wearing black robes and, in earlier times, wigs-[is] that it's not the
person; it's the law."269
Most judges, academics, and first-year law students, however,
would agree that this statement about the judicial process is simply
not accurate. There is too much ambiguity in the law and too
much room for manipulation. Every judicial decision, to some de-
gree or another, reflects the personal views, ideology, and intuition
264. Holmes, supra note 101, at 466.
265. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 5, at 56.
266. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, ATLimc MoNmHLYJan./Feb. 2007, at 104.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 106.
269. Id. at 112.
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of the judge.2 70 There may nonetheless be some good in obscuring
that reality, especially since there is no consensus about the appro-
priate tools to use when the law fails to dictate an outcome. 27 1 De-
nying that judges bring personal views and biases to their decisions
may restore faith in the judiciary; but at the same time, it involves a
cost to the quality of judging and the transparency of the
process.
272
The black robes and wigs are symbols of a particular kind of
judging. For ChiefJustice Roberts, they are metonyms for objective
and impersonal justice. 273 In order to be free from discretion, such
judging requires the suppression of individual personality and ide-
ology. The history of attitudes and rules concerning judicial tem-
perament shows that the impulse to depersonalize the judiciary
generally masks an effort tojustify a kind ofjudicial activism, which
is not necessarily informed by the role that judges actually play.
Rules concerning judicial courtesy and other such symbolic
remnants of an earlier time perpetuate the myth of discretion-free
judging, but avoid confronting the fact that that myth is so terribly
outdated. In other words, the trappings of an older time appear as
a comforting and uncontroversial consistency when they are, in
fact, part of a broader effort to impose a particular judicial style and
resurrect a particular jurisprudential view.
2 74
One of the dangers of this attempt to dehumanize the judiciary
is that it threatens to lend it an artificial legitimacy, a false sense of
security in its own mission. By making it appear as if judges are
simply applying the law, the impersonal image of the judge lends a
superficial justification for an active and significant role for the ju-
diciary in the democratic process. In the 1920s, the Canons ofJudi-
270. Recently, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich relied
on empirical studies to demonstrate how judges think. They argue that judging
involves a complex interaction between intuition and deliberation. See Chris Guth-
rie et al., Blinking on the Bench: HowJudges Decide Cases, 93 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 2-13
(2007).
271. Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 7, at 970-71.
272. Cf. Resnik, supra note 1, at 428-31 (describing the lack of impartiality of
trial judges). There has been interesting recent empirical work on the nature of
judicial decision making, which concludes that judges are subject to the same cog-
nitive illusions as most anyone else. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside theJudicial Mind,
86 CoRLL L. REv. 777 (2001).
273. Rosen, supra note 266, at 112.
274. See Michael Bentley, Island Stories: The British Historical Tradition and Its
Afterlife, TIMEs LrrERARY SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 13, 2006, at 5 (noting the persistence of
the myth of objectivity in certain disciplines including British history and the in-
ability of those disciplines to come to terms with the implications of indeterminacy
without abandoning the entire professional endeavor).
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cial Conduct, with their promotion of proper judicial demeanor,
provided cover for the Lochner Court's activism. 275 In fact, this was
precisely what the authors had in mind.276 The Canons were de-
signed to project an image of the judiciary that would relieve the
public of the growing suspicion that courts were imposing their
own ideology and taking sides in a political battle. It is now fairly
well recognized that courts were, in fact, interpreting statutes and
state and federal constitutions in light of particular policy prefer-
ences.277 Judges justified an active stance toward legislative pro-
nouncements by relying on the special and objective nature of the
law, rather than elaborating or even acknowledging their own ideo-
logical views. 278 But recognizing that law involves the politics and
preferences of judges would lead to a healthy dose of humility.
279
Chief Justice Roberts's preference for eliminating all signs of ego
and personality runs a risk of masking judicial activism in the guise
of neutrality.
While promoting a superficial faith in the judiciary, formalism
and the image of the detached judge also run the risk of distracting
judges and scholars from uncovering new sources of legitimacy for
the judiciary that have more to do with quality than the appearance
of neutrality. In other words, rather than serving to enhance the
administration of justice, independence as it has been conceived
can undermine judicial quality.280 The fallacy is that judicial deci-
sions can be determined without resort to personal ideology and
intuition, and this forces judges to hide from themselves and others
the true cast of their reasoning.281
275. See supra Part II.B; see also United States v. Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (explaining that Lochner grew into a
symbol ofjudges usurping legislative authority by drawing on their own policy pref-
erences to invalidate state and federal legislation).
276. See supra Part II.B.
277. See HoRwITZ, supra note 2, at 53; KALMAN, supra note 98, at 50-51.
278. See supra Part II.
279. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
242, 255-65 (1999); CASS SUNSTEIN, LEcAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT
24-25 (1996). See generally Cass Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HAv. L. REv. 4 (1996) (arguing for a democracy-
forcing form of minimalism in judging controversial, unsettled issues).
280. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 7, at 965-76 (arguing that indepen-
dence ought not to be an end in itself but rather a means to achieve judicial
quality).
281. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 1078-79 (arguing that the myth of discre-
tion-free judging distorts the true meaning ofjudicial decisions because it encour-
ages judges to obscure the real process of reasoning from themselves and from
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As Judge Richard Posner explains, formalism promotes a kind
ofjudicial laziness.2 8 2 It allows judges to ignore necessary facts and
disguise their lack of knowledge at the same time. It encourages
the judiciary to develop without sensitivity to its limitations and
leaves the public with opinions that obscure the actual basis of the
courts' decisions. In contrast, basing decisions explicitly on a com-
plex and interdisciplinary understanding of the underlying facts at
issue in the case might lend the judiciary another source of legiti-
macy based on what Posner refers to as the "good kind of profes-
sionalism," or the mastery of specialized knowledge. 28 3 Posner
opposes this true claim to professional status to a bad kind of pro-
fessionalism, based almost entirely on "mystique"-the tricks that a
profession develops to give the impression of its own importance in
the absence of a true claim to knowledge.28 4 Courtesy rules, like
the other trappings of formalism, become a part of the professional
mystique, which ironically deters the judiciary from developing a
mastery of knowledge, which might give it claim to the good sort of
professionalism. The true mastery of knowledge, in turn, might
provide a different sort of legitimacy based more on quality than on
the appearance of neutrality.
E. Alternative Sources of Legitimacy
Professor Michael Dorf proposes a new potential source of le-
gitimacy for the judiciary which requires abandoning the older no-
tion of judicial neutrality. He describes this source as
"experimentalistjudging," an active and participatory style in which
judges collaborate with the litigants, institutions, agencies, and
others involved in a case to come up with the most socially useful
resolution. 28 5 Judicial neutrality, he explains, no longer requires a
judgment free from political, ideological, or personal considera-
others); Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L.
REv. 1049, 1051-58 (2006).
282. POSNER, supra note 279, at 240-42, 262-64.
283. See id. at 187.
284. Id. at 187-92. Posner relies heavily on the sociology of the professions.
A long line of sociologists have contributed to an understanding of a profession
not as a group with a mastery of particular knowledge but rather a group that has
managed to manufacture the perception that it has such mastery. See, e.g., ANDREw
ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR
(1988); ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHESY, AND POLICY
(1994); MACALi SARFATn LARSON, THE RISE OF PRoiEssjoNALIsM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALSIS (1979).
285. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeteminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 875, 935-38 (2003).
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Annual Survey of American Law
2009] REGULATING DISCOURTESY ON THE BENCH 555
tions. It simply requires a judge who has no stake in the out-
come.2 8 6 The ideal judge in this picture would be active and
involved personally in his cases. In the context of community
courts, Professor Doff explains, a more active and colorful judicial
style would do more to lend legitimacy to the judicial process.287 In
order to deal effectively with parties, institutions, and government
officials, judges may need to become emotionally entangled. In ju-
venile court, they may need to scold; in family court, they may need
to exhort; in community court, they may need to yell to get their
point across.
In such courts, goals of adjudication are determined by demo-
cratically elected legislatures, but judges ascertain the just result in
an ongoing exchange with the local community.28 8 Many courts
already operate on the local level, and judges in those courts espe-
cially ought to be able to use their personalities to engage actively
with the litigants and others to lend a different sort of legitimacy to
the branch.
In addition, promoting the image of a detached judge, who
applies but does not make the law, comes at a cost to diversity in
judicial styles. It imposes one brand of judging on the entire
branch, both state and federal. To the authors of the 1972 Code of
Judicial Conduct, the courtesy rules stood for a kind of bureau-
cratic detachment and enforced regularity. By affirming the rules
of judicial temperament, the authors attempted to create judges in
one mold. By allowing judges to police one another based on this
code and turning the judiciary into a kind of bureaucracy, the state
judiciaries discouraged renegade judges with different styles and
different ideological and jurisprudential views.
As Benjamin N. Cardozo argued, something greater than the
sum of its parts emerges from the "attrition of diverse minds." 2 9
We do not want one sort ofjudge, in part because there is no way of
determining if any one style of judging is better than any other.
2 90
Furthermore, judges in contemporary America perform such differ-
ent functions that even if one judicial style were superior to another
in one context, the same would not hold true in another. Federal
judges perform a different function from state court judges, appel-
late judges do different work from trial and magistrate judges.
286. See id. at 953-54.
287. See id. at 947-54.
288. See generally Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831 (2000).
289. CARwozo, supra note 103, at 177.
290. See POSNER, supra note 279, at 257-65.
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Judges in criminal court have different concerns from those in fam-
ily, community, or drug courts. Allowing judges room to develop
their own styles in relation to the business before them will help us
to explore new forms of legitimacy for the judicial branch. It will
allow us to analyze how different styles are suited to different judi-
cial roles. It may also help us avoid a bland kind of mediocrity and
allow us, by chance, to stumble on something greater.
CONCLUSION
It is harmful to the quality ofjudging to pretend thatjudging is
entirely rational, freed from emotion and passion. It is destructive
to ask judges to ignore their emotional responses, as they were
asked to do in the late nineteenth century. As Justice William J.
Brennan argued, judging cannot "properly be characterized as sim-
ply the application of pure reason to legal problems, nor, at the
other extreme, as the application of the personal will or passion of
the judge."2 9 1 Paying tribute to Justice Cardozo, Brennan ex-
plained that "Cardozo drew our attention to a complex interplay of
forces-rational and emotional, conscious and unconscious-by
which no judge could remain unaffected."2 92 Emotion and passion
are not qualities that we are forced to tolerate solely because they
are inextricable from the decision-making process. Thus,
"[s] ensitivity to one's intuitive and passionate responses, and aware-
ness of the range of human experience, is therefore not only an
inevitable but a desirable part of the judicial process, an aspect
more to be nurtured than feared."29 s Richard Posner has echoed
this assertion: "Emotion is a form of thought, though compressed
and inarticulate, because it is triggered by, and more often than not
produces rational responses to, information." 94 This leads us fi-
nally back to the assumption that rather than ask judges to turn
themselves into "oracles of pure reason,"295 we ought to promote a
diverse judiciary with a variety of intuitions, emotional responses as
291. Brennan, supra note 157, at 3; see also Guthrie et al., supra note 270 (ar-
guing that intuition, emotion, and reason all play a role in judging).
292. Brennan, supra note 157, at 3.
293. Id. at 10. Brennan defines passion as "the range of emotional and intui-
tive responses to a given set of facts or arguments, responses which often speed
into our consciousness far ahead of the lumbering syllogisms of reason." Id. at 9.
294. Posner, supra note 281, at 1063.
295. Brennan, supra note 157, at 5. This conclusion is also in keeping with an
observation made by Professors Ferejohn and Kramer that independence is not a
goal in itself but rather a means to an important end, a well-functioning judiciary.
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 7, at 963-64.
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well as deliberative tools, and out of that, we can hope for some-
thing better than the sum of its parts.
Given the diversity of theories about how judges should decide
cases, the system ought to value a form of independence that allows
judges to develop adjudicatory styles in accord with their own per-
sonal and professional views. Because they contribute to a notion
of a detached and purely rational judge, the judicial courtesy rules
run the risk of imposing a particular judicial style at odds with this
goal. Furthermore, there are times when ajudge is asked to answer
questions that involve irreducible uncertainty, when no theories,
philosophies, or other disciplines provide an adequate solution. In
many courts, that kind of uncertainty is more the rule than the ex-
ception. In those cases particularly, a judge ought to be free to
draw on his own intuitions and even passions without fear of nega-
tive consequences. To encourage this sort of judging, judicial con-
duct commissions ought to be cautious and sparing in their use of
the courtesy rules.
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